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ABSTRACT 
Humans and nonhuman animals categorize the natural world, and their behaviors 
can reveal how they use the stimulus information they encounter in service of these 
categorizations. Rigorous psychological study of categorization has offered many insights 
into the processes of categorization and their relative strengths and weaknesses across 
species. Probabilistic categorization, in which the relationships among stimulus 
information and category membership that are observed by an individual are 
fundamentally probabilistic, presents unique challenges both to the categorizer and to the 
psychologist attempting to model their behavior. Challenges notwithstanding, 
probabilistic categorization is an exceptionally ecologically relevant problem to human 
and nonhuman animal cognition alike. This dissertation reports the effects of many 
manipulations of theoretical interest on computer-trained rhesus macaques’ and 
capuchin monkeys’ inferred cognitive strategy use in a computerized version of a classic 
probabilistic categorization task. Experiment 1 probed cognitive strategy use across five 
variants of the same task in which the probability structure was constant, but the 
appearances and onscreen locations of cues and responses changed. Experiment 2 
presented a series of manipulations of theoretical interest to the animals by changing the 
probability and reward structures of the task. Experiment 3 manipulated the stimuli of 
the task in ways motivated by findings across perceptual psychology literature. 
Experiment 4 extended the reward rate manipulations of Experiment 2 even further. 
Across four experiments, inferred strategy use was remarkably stable. Those animals that 
used cue-based strategies often returned to the same specific strategy experiment after 
experiment, as the cues, responses, probabilities, and contingencies changed around 
them. This finding is discussed in relation to questions of a real or functional ceiling on 
sophistication of strategy use, the robustness of cognitive individual differences in 
nonhuman primates, and future directions for comparative study of cognitive strategy use 
in probabilistic categorization.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 The relationships among minds, behaviors, and environments are fundamentally 
uncertain, and in many ways the cognitive competencies of mind can be understood as 
specific adaptations that serve to mediate this uncertainty (Glimcher, 2005). For 
example, the structure of many behavioral economic games is such that one or more 
players attempts to maximize the unpredictability of their responses as observed by other 
players (e.g., Rapoport & Budescu, 1992). Likewise, the structure of complex nervous 
systems are such that neuronal activity and neurotransmitter release are probabilistic 
events (Stevens, 2003). Cognitive scientists need not appeal to such evolutionarily 
ultimate or neuroscientifically molecular processes to find unpredictability in animal 
brains and behaviors, as the stimulus environments we interact with daily do not present 
us with transparent, deterministic, causal relationships.  
 A mind’s transformation of the uncertainty of the environment into discrete 
representations, decisions, and behaviors is termed inference. Inference from 
probabilistic evidence is a key feature of human and nonhuman animal (hereafter: 
animal) life. A jury can only be uncertain as to a defendant’s guilt or innocence, but they 
can make an informed inference via physical evidence, witness testimony, and reasonable 
doubt. The new restaurant on the corner may be delicious or nauseating, but inference 
from online reviews, a health inspector’s report, and word of mouth can rapidly clarify 
the relative likelihood of food poisoning. A hungry monkey faces a similar dilemma, when 
a nearby fungus might be a poisonous toadstool or an edible mushroom. The relative 
probabilities of fitness advantage and disadvantage that might be won by consuming the 
fungus must be evaluated amidst considerable uncertainty and nontrivial stakes. 
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 One way to describe this practice of inference is by using principles of probability 
theory, especially the rearrangement of conditional probabilities described by Bayes’ rule 
(Etz & Vandekerckhove, 2018). Bayes’ rule offers a straightforward way to synthesize 
probabilistic information into a form that is useful to a decision-maker: it is the 
probability that one event will occur over another, or that one hypothesis will be 
supported versus another. Interestingly, to cognitive psychologists, normative human 
behavior does not typically reflect these calculations in any straightforward way (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974). Moreover, there are other ways, beyond differing from Bayesian 
computation, in which inferences of humans and other species are not so sterile as 
probability theory might suggest. Adult humans (Washburn et al., 2005), human children 
(Beran et al., 2012), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes; Beran et al., 2015), orangutans (genus 
Pongo; Marsh & MacDonald, 2012), rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta; Tu et al., 2015), 
Guinea baboons (Papio papio; Malassis et al., 2015), a dolphin (Tursiops truncatus; 
Smith, 2010), and rats (Rattus norvegicus; Foote & Crystal, 2007) are among the 
populations that have demonstrated the ability to behave in accordance with recognition 
of their own uncertainty.  
 At least for humans, this relationship with uncertainty is fraught. Objectively, there 
are few situations in which it is adaptive to be underinformed about the contingencies of 
one’s environment. But subjectively, the story is not so clear. On one hand, live events like 
sports are uniquely profitable entertainment (with 89 of the 100 most watched broadcasts 
in the United States in 2018 related to live sports), in no small part because their contents 
are fundamentally uncertain (Crupi, 2019). On the other hand, and less trivially, 
individuals at risk of high trait anxiety or clinically significant anxiety disorders are 
intolerant of the subjective feeling of not knowing that comes with such uncertainty 
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(Carleton et al., 2007). These examples are expository only, and scarcely scratch the 
surface of how probability and psychological processes intersect. Uncertainty is, to a large 
or small degree, explicitly or implicitly, a component of any psychological process 
concerned with information (Garner, 1962). 
 This dissertation will describe the strategies that species use when identifying 
objects (categorizing a stimulus into one or many unique psychological groups) and 
coordinating behavior on the basis of such judgments (engaging in decision-making by 
using the external and internal stimulus information at its disposal to guide behavior) in 
service of probabilistic inference. I will use this introductory chapter to catalog previous 
research on the cognitions and behaviors that are characteristic of categorization and 
decision-making in conditions of uncertainty. Next, I will introduce one specific 
methodology for bringing into the psychology laboratory the types of probabilistic 
categorization and decision-making that organisms face in their environments, discuss 
what this methodology has already contributed to our understanding of such constructs, 
and identify its limitations. In the second chapter, I will present a role for comparative 
psychology in answering a number of outstanding questions about probabilistic 
categorization, alongside discussion of species-specific considerations that suggest a 
match between mechanisms of probabilistic categorization and the cognitive 
competencies of New World and Old World monkeys. Further chapters will describe a set 
of experiments that probed the degree to which these characteristic cognitions and 
behaviors are specific to the stimulus properties and/or embedded probabilities of 
previously published experiments, the results of these experiments, and implications for 
the comparative study of how cognition intersects with chance. 
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1.1 Probabilistic Categorization  
Very high categorization performance must be required of humans and nonhuman 
animals in their natural habitats, where dangerous predators cannot be mistaken as 
benign and new chances to elect political officials in the United States come only every 
two to six years (Ashby & Ennis, 2006; Kruschke, 2005; Smith, 2014). Psychologists often 
present relationships between psychological inputs and their observable outputs as if they 
were deterministic: an organism that perfectly used the information at its disposal would 
unerringly predict the toxicity of a mushroom or the danger posed by a large animal's 
silhouette (Ashby & Maddox, 2005). Indeed, three of the four major classes of 
categorization experiments identified by Ashby and Ell (2001) model relationships of this 
kind. In the first, rule-based tasks, including the influential Wisconsin Card Sort Task, an 
explicit, verbally declarable stimulus dimensions or some conjunction of such stimulus 
dimensions are mapped to categories (Eling et al., 2008). In the second, information-
integration tasks, like many variants of the sinewave grating task of Ashby and colleagues 
(1998), stimulus dimensions are mapped to categories in a way that cannot be explicitly 
declared (e.g., Qadri et al., 2019; Smith et al., 2012). In the third, prototype-distortion 
tasks, like the “A, not A” tasks of Posner & Keele (1968, 1970), stimulus dimensions are 
mapped to categories based on the degree of similarity a prospective category member 
shares with an unseen, prototypical category member. It is only the fourth major class of 
categorization experiment, unstructured tasks, that maps items to categories arbitrarily 
without regard to any stimulus dimension (Little et al., 2006).  
In each of these designs, with few exceptions (the subset of information-
integration tasks that does not provide deterministic mappings between stimulus 
properties and category membership will be discussed later in this chapter), any object 
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with a given set of values on stimulus dimensions of interest is mapped, with absolute 
certainty, to a specific category member or response. From these experiments, a 
psychologist can evaluate the degree to which an individual or population evidenced 
learning of these deterministic mappings of stimulus information to a category. Where 
perfect utilization of the available information is not achieved, a mélange of exploratory 
behaviors, novelty biases, and motoric considerations is often assumed to be to blame. 
Any deterministic conception of categorization understates the degree to which 
real relationships of interest between psychological inputs and observable outputs are 
probabilistic (Kruschke & Johansen, 1999). Most charitably, deterministic categorization 
tasks are a simplification of how a human or animal's categorization mechanisms work in 
a single, specific context. For example, a child is either tall enough to ride a roller coaster, 
or not tall enough to ride it. A single, deterministic dimension of height guides 
categorization, and many other dimensions (e.g., clothing, hairstyle, freckle count) are 
irrelevant. Decades of categorization research might inform whether such a 
categorization is made by explicit, rule-based reasoning, or implicit, procedural learning, 
or other orthodoxy. Both this depiction of real-life categorization and its experimental 
models face limits to their validity and implementation. Such a perspective can only be 
agnostic about how learners manage less deterministic cue information across contexts. 
This is a serious shirking of duty, because demand for the ability to combine many 
probabilistically noisy, conflicting cues is high. Many other categorizations about our 
prospective coaster rider would require an evaluation of many dimensions that combine 
far more fitfully. A school administrator would, one hopes, categorize the child into an 
advanced, remedial, or on-level classroom based on an exceedingly complex mixture of 
teacher impressions, classroom behavior, and scores from math, reading, and science 
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assessments. None of these cues are perfect, and the administrator can only hope to make 
an informed probabilistic categorization about the student's true category membership. 
In addition to these questions of the ecological validity of classic categorization 
tasks, other domains of the social sciences also caution against simplifications of natural 
category structures. To economists, there are insidious consequences to positing any 
stable, deterministic relationship between an observable stimulus dimension and 
category membership (Goodhart, 1984). To adopt a popular example: in academic 
settings there is probably some relationship between a citation metric and the quality of 
scholarship of an academic (i.e., a citation metric dimension can be used to categorize 
academics as high quality or low quality scholars). However, as soon as the citation metric 
becomes conventionally used as a deterministic predictor of scholarly quality, it ceases to 
be one, because selection pressure for both academic and categorizer is to maximize on 
that metric instead of maximizing on scholarly quality. In education policy a similar 
caution is made regarding standardized achievement testing. Standardized tests may 
deterministically predict scholastic success in normal teaching and testing conditions, but 
not when school and student resources are subverted to maximize standardized test 
scores (Sidorkin, 2016). Even in a relatively sterile social science like applied statistics, 
the concept of overfitting codifies this idea that a well-validated relationship observed in 
one context cannot be expected to be perfectly maintained in a new context (Babyak, 
2004).  
Psychologists use weather prediction tasks to model naturalistic, probabilistic 
category structures by structuring the cue information available to an organism to be 
probabilistically related to the value of the responses an organism can make (Gluck & 
Bower, 1988). In this way, the uncertainty that permeates real life categorization contexts 
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can be accounted for with exacting specificity, and titrated continuously. In most classic 
weather prediction designs, each trial presents a participant with one to three imperfect 
cues (often stylized as medical symptoms or tarot cards; Knowlton et al., 1994). The 
participant is asked to choose which of two outcomes will be scored as correct in that trial. 
Perfect performance is impossible in such a task, because even the greatest weight of cue 
information a participant might receive will still underspecify the correct outcome. 
Instead, the participant, like the school administrator, must work within their uncertainty 
to make the best decision possible with the information that they have. 
 
1.2 Probabilistic Decision-Making  
The inferences made during these probabilistic categorizations are observable in 
how individuals behave in naturally-occurring and experimentally-derived decision-
making contexts. Humans and animals are often found to deviate from probability 
theories’ recommendations given a set of probabilistic information, even when the task is 
well-learned (Nickerson, 2004). To chronicle these deviations, cognitive psychologists 
have cultivated an impressive bestiary of the many heuristics and biases that blight civil, 
rational minds (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1984, Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 2014). For example, humans and pigeons neglect the prior probability of an 
estimable occurrence and conversely assign undue decisional weight to any predictive 
information, termed base-rate neglect (Bar-Hillel, 1980; Fantino et al., 2005; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1982; Zentall & Clement, 2002). A positive test for a rare disease might be 
understood as highly likely to reflect that the disease is present, even though the low prior 
probability of the presence of the disease would instead suggest that a false alarm by the 
test is much more likely. In a related example, this cue information is weighted so greatly 
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that human evaluations of the probability space are not internally, logically consistent 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). This conjunction fallacy is frequently illustrated via a short 
vignette about a young woman with a history of social activism (sometimes called the 
Linda problem). Human participants often evaluate that she is more likely to be a bank 
teller who is active in feminist causes than that she is “merely” a bank teller. The young 
woman’s activism is so strongly weighted by human observers that they propose the 
logical impossibility that the conjunction of two states could be greater than one of the 
states in isolation. Even at the earliest stages of probabilistic decision-making, humans 
are not particularly successful at identifying where probabilistic information is and where 
it is not. Humans routinely report that probabilistic relationships exist among sequences 
or stimuli when the process that generated them was actually paradigmatically random 
(Zhao et al., 2014). 
There is a sense in which the size of this apparent gulf between recommendations 
derived from Bayesian computation of probabilistic information and observed human 
behavior has been exaggerated. The way in which such probabilistic decision-making 
problems are typically framed, with percentile probabilities disseminated in words, is 
ideal for Bayesian computation. This is highly different from how humans and animals 
would sample probabilistic information from their natural environments (Gigerenzer & 
Hoffrage, 1995). When experimenters present human participants with mechanically 
identical probabilistic decision-making problems in a representational format more akin 
to how evolution shaped minds to intuit probabilistic information, many of the irrational 
biases can be substantially or entirely muted (Gigerenzer, 1991; Gigerenzer et al., 1991).  
Accounts of human probabilistic decision-making behavior that seek to coax biases 
from participants and those that forgive these biases as part of an entropy or effort 
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reduction shorthand compete to provide superior accounts for probabilistic decision-
making behavior (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Kahneman & Tversky, 1996; Shah & 
Oppenheimer, 2008). Similarly, conceptions of probability theory that draw from perfect 
knowledge of the problem space compete with subjective, observed event frequency to 
describe human interactions with probability theory best (Gigerenzer, 1991; Gigerenzer, 
1994). Post-hoc labeling of characteristic responses of humans in highly specific, highly 
verbal probabilistic decision-making contexts is common. In contrast, process-based or 
mechanistic accounts of cognition and behavior are relatively uncommon (Gigerenzer, 
1996). Stanovich and West (2000), and more popularly Kahneman (Kahneman, 2011; 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), understand the cognitive processes that produce these 
characteristic responses as derived from two systems: one quick, effortless, intuitive, and 
automatic and the other deliberate, effortful, and systematic. This clustering represents 
an improvement on merely labeling biases, and is intellectually fruitful in that the 
individual and correlational psychologies of how individuals may deploy these systems 
can be explored (Cronbach, 1957). But even this approach reduces to a fairly trivial 
labeling of inferred cognitive processing: “fast” or “slow”, with some inconsistently 
correlated features (Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018).  
The restricted nature of these dual-process accounts distracts from the substantial 
challenge that cognitive psychologists face in seeking to describe decision-making 
processes molecularly, via their inputs, outputs, processes, neuronal substrates, and 
proximate and ultimate causes. Kruschke and Johansen (1999) took up this challenge 
with their Rapid Attention SHifts N Learning (RASHNL) model for probabilistic 
cognition in which mathematical relationships among inputs from the environment, their 
representation by an individual, and behavioral outputs can be specified exactly. More 
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specifically, the RASHNL model built on previous connectionist models of human 
cognition (e.g., Gluck & Bower, 1988) to describe a probabilistic cognition that changes 
continuously and dynamically across experience. More recently Trueblood, Busemeyer, 
Pothos and their collaborators have advanced models of human probabilistic decision-
making that trade connectionist principles for those borrowed from particle physics and, 
in doing so, make explicit the characteristic indeterminacy of human brains and behaviors 
(Pothos & Busemeyer, 2009; Trueblood & Busemeyer, 2011; Trueblood et al., 2017). This 
computationally intensive account, termed quantum cognition, has furnished formal 
mathematical descriptions of how many of the characteristic responses humans make in 
probabilistic situations may arise. These formal models, and others like them, provide 
accounts of human probabilistic decision-making at unprecedented levels of detail. 
Interestingly, the degree to which these models impact scientific discourse would seem to 
be less a question of their accuracy (they provide a good fit to data, both real and 
simulated) and more of the degree to which their core ideas can be disseminated to and 
internalized by cognitive and applied psychologists who have already adopted the 
fundamentally intuitive, but scientifically fraught dual-process typology. 
Probabilistic decision-making theories thus appear to fall along a continuum. At 
one extreme, researchers figuratively plant a tiny flag on the response that they will 
consider rational and hundreds or thousands of additional flags on every other point 
(each with its own unique identifier and publication). At the other extreme, researchers 
seek to recreate, via pure mathematics, artificial neural networks, and/or principles of 
particle physics, the computations undertaken by the brain-shaped black box that 
transforms psychological inputs into behavioral outputs. An approach that appreciates 
each of these perspectives may be uniquely valuable. Rigorously and mathematically 
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defining experimentally derived inputs and predicted outputs is a requirement of 
scientific progress, and a prerequisite of most statistical analyses of merit. That said, in 
many contexts people and their cognitive processes really are clustered, such that labels 
can properly represent psychological relationships (Bartlema et al., 2014). An 
epistemological midpoint might borrow features from each extreme to make predictions 
that are not only accurate, but are also transparently interpretable, accessible to other 
scientists, and portable to new areas of cognitive inquiry.  
Lee and colleagues have done much to advance such a perspective by using 
principles of statistical model selection to identify which account, among competing 
theories of involved cognitive processes, best accords with behavioral data of probabilistic 
decision-making tasks. For example, Lee and Newell (2011) applied this strategy to a 
classic decision-making problem in which the size of German cities is estimated. They 
used behavioral and simulated data with competing formal models arranged using the 
principles of the “Take-the-Best” heuristic and the influential weighted-additive rule. In 
this way classic ideas about normative human decision-making behavior, complete with 
heuristics and biases, are ported intact for principled, statistical evaluation alongside 
competing accounts. Critically, these evaluations may inform what information was 
utilized by participants and how participants’ cognitive competencies utilized this 
information, alongside estimation of which rule or process provided the best fit. In the 
case of Lee and Newell (2011), this approach facilitated novel inferences about participant 
search strategies and stopping rules. In other cases, this approach has served to 
discriminate among categorical and continuous differences in human cognitive processes 
in a Multidimensional Scaling design (Bartlema et al., 2014) and demonstrate participant 
sensitivity to probabilistically weighted evidence in a decision-making task (Lee, 2016). 
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1.3 Strategy Analyses in Weather Prediction 
A key feature of weather prediction tasks is that they can be completed at high rates 
of success by any one of many different response strategies (Gluck et al., 2002; Meeter et 
al., 2006). For example, in the set of relationships between cues and response 
probabilities that is often used by weather prediction researchers, a simple Take-the-Best-
style heuristic is nearly optimal (Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Todd & Gigerenzer, 1999). For 
this reason, the more meaningful inference about participant performance in a weather 
prediction task is not merely the proportion at which participants chose the correct 
outcome, but rather the degree to which participants' responses are consistent with use 
of one strategy or another. Because equivalent task performance by individual 
participants does not require equivalent response mechanisms, response strategy use in 
the task can vary wildly within the realm of roughly-equivalent rates of correct 
responding.  
These inferences are arrived at via strategy analyses techniques that compare many 
theoretically-interesting models that make different, explicit predictions about 
participant behavior in the task. Gluck, Shohamy, and Myers (2002) inaugurated the use 
of such techniques in weather prediction designs. In their task, participants were asked 
to predict whether ‘sun’ or ‘rain’ was a likelier outcome on the basis of a set of 1-3 
arbitrary, probabilistic cues. To infer participant strategy use, they used a simple least 
mean squared error measure in which a normalized count of the expected number of sun 
responses predicted by each strategy minus the observed number of sun responses was 
computed for each candidate model. Candidate models fell into three major designations. 
Multi-Cue strategies assumed the optimal response (i.e., response that would be correct 
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most often given the available cue information) to every cue combination, as if the 
participant perfectly integrated the cue information they received. Single-cue strategies 
assumed that responses were made based on the presence or absence of one cue. This type 
of strategy assumed fundamentally rule-based responses (e.g., if cue1 is present, choose 
response 1. if cue1 is not present, choose response 2). Finally, Singleton strategies 
assumed that the participant made the optimal response any time only one cue was 
presented, but failed to successfully integrate the information yielded by multiple cues. 
The initial strategy analysis of Gluck and colleagues described most participants as best 
fit by Singleton strategies, with few participants best fit by Single-Cue strategies and even 
fewer best fit by optimal, Multi-Cue strategies. 
Substantial elaborations on the strategy analysis of Gluck and colleagues were 
made by Meeter, Myers, Shohamy, Hopkins, and Gluck (2006). Meeter and colleagues 
translated the analysis to one that could be guided by standardized principles of model 
selection and fit measures like Akaike's Information Criterion (Akaike, 1974), rather than 
the opaquer inference yielded by the least mean squared error measure. Model 
parameters representing participants' response rates to a predicted outcome were fixed 
at a proportion less than one, modeling the assumption that even at mature responding 
participants don't respond in perfect accordance with their strategy, and then simulated 
response data were used to guide parameter assignment in the model. With their refined 
modeling procedures, Meeter and colleagues tested a greater variety of plausible response 
strategies. A class of Intermediate strategies was considered, including strategies that 
integrate information across multiple cues so long as the cues provide converging 
evidence. Perhaps most importantly, Meeter and colleagues included a Random strategy 
that acted as a buffer against false alarms of strategy use when none was really present. 
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These strategy analyses are part of a larger movement in the psychological sciences 
towards categorical inferences about participant brains and behaviors. As previously 
discussed, Lee (2016) expanded upon an earlier analysis of Hilbig and Moshagen (2014) 
to make inferences about probable models for participant decision-making. In cognitive 
neuroscience, mode networks like the default mode network (Greicius et al., 2003) or, 
more recently, quasi-periodic patterns (Abbas et al., 2019), are similar conceits for 
describing consistent patterns among isolable observations. In each of these analyses, as 
in that of Meeter and colleagues, many correlated observations, be they consistent 
patterns of activation and inhibition of independent neural networks or consistently 
strategic responses made to specific sets of cue information, were synthesized using 
modern model selection tools to offer novel insights into the phenomena of interest. In 
each, the phenomena of interest were better understood by describing where they were 
consistent with an unobservable, common cause. Indeed, this exact manner of inference 
is precisely the one sought by the scientific method: which of the available candidate sets 
of predictions (e.g., models, hypotheses, theories) best predicts observed data?  
In weather prediction applications, these analyses reveal a characteristic pattern 
of responses made by neurotypical adult humans. Responses are initially unstructured 
and best fit by the Random strategy, as in the absence of any experience with the task any 
relationship between cues and outcomes cannot be known (there is no logical relationship 
between cues and outcomes to which a participant might reason). Random responses 
typically give way to Single-Cue or Singleton responses based on single elements of the 
available cue information. This trend mirrors inferences from absolute categorization 
tasks in which rule-based responding is dominant over other types of responding such 
that if an explicit rule is made available to participants, they will invariably use it (Church 
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et al., 2018, but see Duncan et al., 2018 for demonstration of a preference for multicue 
strategies over single-cue responding in an atypical weather prediction task). In many 
weather prediction designs, the majority of participants do not use more complex 
strategies than these rule-based, Take-the-Best strategies. These results are not 
surprising, with analogs in the human decision-making literature (Lee & Newell, 2011; 
Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000) and deterministic categorization literature across species 
(Smith et al., 2012). A minority of adult, neurotypical humans have sometimes used more 
optimal strategies that include Multi-Cue integration of the cue information at late stages 
of the task (Gluck et al., 2002; Kemény & Lukács, 2010; Meeter et al., 2006; Newell et al., 
2007). 
 
1.4 Cognitive Neuroscience of Weather Prediction 
Of greater theoretical significance are the inferences made about participant 
populations other than neurotypical adults. Theories of language impairment, like the 
procedural deficit hypothesis, posit that cognitive impairments to processing of 
probabilistic information are the root cause of diagnoses like specific language 
impairment or developmental dyslexia (Ullman & Pierpont, 2005; West et al., 2018). 
Theorists have tested such theories by comparing weather prediction performances of 
groups with and without these diagnoses. Finn and colleagues (2016) reported that 10-
year-old children made optimal responses in a weather prediction task at the same rate 
as adults, but did not report the results of a strategy analysis comparing the two 
populations. This result contrasts sharply with measures of declarative cognition of the 
two groups, with adults demonstrably superior in working memory and long-term 
memory measures. Gabay and colleagues (2015) reported that adults with developmental 
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dyslexia demonstrated impaired learning on weather prediction tasks relative to matched 
controls but were not significantly different from controls in their frequency of use of 
Single-cue, Singleton, or Multicue strategies. Kemény and Lukács (2010) compared 
language-impaired children (age M = 11.3 years, SD = 1.3), with age-matched typically-
developing children and adults. Language-impaired children performed at chance levels 
across increasing experience in the task, and 11 out of 13 participating language-impaired 
children were not well fit by any cue-based strategy. In contrast, both typically-developing 
children and adults performed at above-chance levels within the first 50 trials and 
adopted increasingly complex strategies over the course of testing.  
Use of weather prediction tasks across participant populations have also been 
important to the formulation and development of dual-process theories of learning and 
memory that posit dissociable memory systems that vary in, among other things, the 
degree to which the participant has conscious access to the inputs, outputs, and processes 
of the system (Ashby et al., 1998). Knowlton et al. (1994) innovated this application of 
weather prediction tasks in their exploration of the learning and memory abilities of eight 
amnesic patients (two Korsakoff's diagnoses, one bilateral medial thalamic infarction 
diagnosis, four with known or strongly evidenced hippocampal damage diagnoses, and 
one idiopathic case). The amnesic participants performed as well as matched, 
neurotypical control participants early in learning, but were markedly worse than controls 
later in learning. The authors argued that because early weather prediction responding is 
better accomplished without declarative memory (the probabilistic nature of the task 
means that relying on discrete memory of what happened in a previous trial may be 
misleading), amnesic participants' performance was not impaired. It was only later in 
learning, after many opportunities to cultivate declarative knowledge about the 
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probabilistic structure of the task, that control participants performed better than 
participants with amnesia.  
Knowlton et al. (1996) offered additional support to this argument. They presented 
a weather prediction task to 7 participants with medial-temporal lobe amnesia and 5 
participants with diencephalic amnesia, to 20 participants with Parkinson's disorder 
(damage to striatal regions and others), and to age-matched control participants. As an 
additional measure, they also asked participants verbally to report what they had learned 
from the task. As in Knowlton et al. (1994), participants with amnesia were as effective at 
the weather prediction task as controls during early task performance. However, these 
participants could not answer basic multiple-choice questions about their testing 
experience. In contrast, participants with Parkinson's disorder were not effective at the 
core weather prediction task, but they were as effective as controls in reporting basic facts 
about the testing session. This double-dissociation has been considered prime evidence 
for the existence of two separable neurocognitive systems: a conscious, explicit, 
declarative system underpinned by the hippocampus and mediotemporal regions (and 
expressed via frontal regions) and an unconscious, implicit, procedural system 
underpinned by the basal ganglia (and expressed via motor regions). 
Neuronal encoding of the probabilisitic information associated with visual cues in 
weather prediction tasks is thought to occur via the plasticity of synapses in the lateral 
intraparietal cortex (Soltani & Wang, 2010; Yang & Shadlen, 2007). This region is 
implicated in a variety of primate psychological processes, including memory for and 
attention to visual stimuli (Sereno & Maunsell, 1998) and reinforcement learning in the 
more probabilistic games of behavioral economics (Seo, Barraclough, & Lee, 2009). 
Unlike the structured deviations from normative probability theory that humans 
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frequently evidence in their behavior in the task, extracellular recordings of the synaptic 
activity of the lateral intraparietal cortex have been found to very faithfully represent the 
probability structure of a weather prediction task (Yang & Shadlen, 2007). The nature of 
this synaptic activity can even explain certain systematic biases that are typically 
exhibited in specific probabilistic decision-making contexts, like base rate neglect (Soltani 
& Wang, 2010). Given this relatively precise encoding of probabilistic information at the 
neuronal level, it is interesting that humans who complete weather prediction tasks are 
reliably highly variable in both their task behavior and in their explicit reports about their 
cognitive strategy use in the task.  
These data are from a small number of neurons, from a small number of 
nonhuman primates. As such, the generalizability of these neuronal readings is extremely 
restricted. These reports perhaps suggest that not only is the probability structure of the 
task identical across variably behaving animals, but also the encoding of this probability 
structure is equivalent across variably behaving animals. In that case the variability must 
arise somewhat further down the [neuro]cognitive stream, perhaps at one or both of the 
regions identified by the separable systems account. The more rule-like processes 
described by the separable systems account (and modeled by weather prediction strategy 
analyses) take on a special role in culling the variability in psychology of probabilistic 
inference that remains unexplained. 
 
1.5 Interim Summary of Weather Prediction Research 
Critically, the reviewed weather prediction studies (1) report behavioral 
dissociations that reveal differential engagement of multiple memory systems over the 
course of the task, and (2) demonstrate a marked link between the requirements of the 
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task and clinical language and memory deficits. Such a link would have substantial 
neurocognitive and clinical applications (Krishnan et al., 2016). However, other lines of 
research make such a conclusion more fraught. Newell, Lagnado, and Shanks (2007) 
presented multiple experiments that tested the predictions of dual-process theories in 
weather prediction tasks. If classic weather prediction performance is the product of 
implicit, procedural learning mechanisms, not explicit, declarative mechanisms, then the 
inclusion of a concurrent task that taps into more declarative mechanisms should not 
meaningfully disrupt weather prediction performance. Their Experiment 1 demonstrated 
that inclusion of a verbal Stroop-like concurrent task disrupted learning of the weather 
prediction task and changed the distribution of strategies used by participants. Dual-
process descriptions of weather prediction tasks also suggest that the task is completed 
by procedural learning mechanisms because reward feedback is administered to 
participant responses, and that more declarative mechanisms would be involved when 
reward feedback is not administered in this way. Newell and colleagues' Experiment 2 
tested groups of participants on weather prediction tasks either in which feedback was 
administered after responses or in which participants passively viewed cues and their 
associations to outcomes and reported that participant performance and strategy use did 
not significantly differ between groups. Taken together, the invariability of classic 
weather prediction tasks to changes in feedback contingencies and primary reinforcers 
suggests no special role for uniquely procedural learning mechanisms in the task. In 
contrast, declarative insight into what was learned in the task was strong throughout. No 
manipulation in either experiment affected the accuracy of participants' verbal 
estimations of the relationships between cues and outcomes. 
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Classic conceptions of weather prediction are also critiqued on grounds of 
philosophy of science (e.g., Keren & Schul, 2009). Newell, Dunn, and Kalish (2011) argued 
that the dual-systems conception of weather prediction performance is presented in such 
a way that it cannot be readily falsified. That the performance of amnesic participants is 
equivalent to that of control participants early in learning but not as good late in learning 
is regarded as key evidence for both the mostly-procedural nature of weather prediction 
tasks and the existence of dissociable memory systems (Knowlton et al., 1994). However, 
precise behavioral indicators for when a participant might be using procedural versus 
declarative mechanisms to complete the weather prediction task are conspicuously 
absent. Instead, the structure of the argument from dual-systems theorists seems to be 
one that fallaciously affirms the consequent: a theory that permits fluid switching 
between procedural and declarative systems could accommodate the behavioral data 
from amnesic and control participants, so the theory is supported. In such a case the fluid 
switching offers its own inferential minefield, since the dual-systems are malleable 
enough to accommodate nearly any behavioral data (Newell et al., 2011; Palmeri & 
Flanery, 1999). Ashby and Maddox (2005) offered the more moderate criticism of classic 
weather prediction designs in which what they call "explicit memorization" might be so 
dominant a response strategy that much of the nuance of weather prediction tasks and 
their analyses is ultimately wasted, and the centrality of weather prediction to dual-
process theory-crafting is overstated. 
An alternative conception of weather prediction tasks and data (implied by the 
earlier claim of affirming the consequent) is a family of theories and analyses that have 
described weather prediction learning as happening gradually (Speekenbrink et al., 
2008). In these conceptions, any observed differences in weather prediction 
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performances by different participant populations are described as the product of 
differences in learning rates, not discrete, rule-like shifts. In a way that makes explicit the 
distinction between processes of categorization and decision-making response behavior 
outlined at the outset of this manuscript, Speekenbrink et al. (2008) utilized an analysis 
strategy that divorces modeling of learning from modeling of responding (Cooksey, 1996). 
This lens model yielded similar inferences to those of previous weather prediction 
analyses; that is, that amnesic participants are very nearly as good as controls at the task, 
they learn much about specifics of the task, and suffer an episodic memory deficit about 
other aspects of the experiment. Their analyses differ in that they describe nuances of 
participant performance via quantitative differences in learning rate between the groups 
rather than the types of modular, systematic, qualitative differences described by dual-
process theorists. 
Notably, at least in the case of weather prediction tasks, there is not disagreement 
about whether the competing models fit to data (they do). Indeed, the opposed theorists 
and their opposed models make largely the same predictions about each dataset (Meeter 
et al., 2008). As in other realms of cognitive psychology in which complementary models 
are wielded by theoretically opposed parties, relatively semantic explanatory virtues are 
leveraged against one another in relatively subjective ways (Barsalou, 1992; Fidler, 2018; 
Smith et al., 2016; Wills & Pothos, 2012). A strategy analysis perspective assumes discrete 
shifts in behavior and describes them using language that implies dual influences of 
procedural learning and cognitive control (i.e., participants [choose to] adopt one 
[cognitive] strategy or another to complete the task). The lens model perspective assumes 
gradual updating of learned associations between cues and outcomes, and gradual 
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updating of the utilization of those learned associations. Each approach has its merits, but 
a strategy analysis perspective boasts the following explanatory virtues (Fidler, 2018):  
• Analogy between the inferences of strategy analyses and those of other disciplines 
are many, and were reviewed above (e.g., comparable models from the judgment 
and decision-making psychological literatures, neuroscience mode networks, etc.).  
• The assumptions of strategy analyses are testable in a more robust manner - 
strategies posit specific behaviors to specific sets of cues and test whether 
responses conform to that specification at an arbitrarily frequent rate (e.g., 
thousands of times in Whitham & Washburn, 2020).  
• Ultimately a strategy analysis perspective is more intellectually fruitful. The 
perspective yields a dissertation of theoretically interesting confirmatory and 
exploratory hypotheses that can enrich our understanding of an important set of 
cognitions, whether or not the strategy analysis perspective itself withstands the 
tests of time.  
[For reasons of aesthetic sensibility, the remainder of this manuscript will use 
strategy use to connote response strategy use inferred by strategy analysis. I will imply 
discrete shifts from one strategy to another, pursuant to published research that makes a 
well-evidenced case that weather predictions tasks are better understood as mostly 
declarative and rule-based in nature (Newell et al., 2007). Note that despite this choice, 
these conclusions are analytically-derived inferences about discrete behaviors (not the 
direct observation of mind the concise language may imply), and but one among many 
interesting ways of exploring mind and behavior via weather prediction tasks.] 
Divorced from any role as standard-bearer in dual-process theorizing, weather 
prediction tasks are in many ways an ideal model of human and animal cognition and 
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behavior in response to complex, probabilistic information. Unlike nearly every 
experimental task of probabilistic decision-making research programs, the task need not 
be a verbal problem in which each word is subject to etymological scrutiny (Hertwig & 
Gigerenzer, 1999) and changing just a few words changes the nature of the problem 
(Dulany & Hilton, 1991). Instead, probabilistic information can be disseminated across 
experience in a way more akin to how natural frequencies are sampled by many species 
(Gallistel & Gibbon, 2000). Indeed, how this probabilistic information is disseminated is 
in many ways as flexible as the experimenter is: cues need not be restricted to one 
modality or another, the number of cues can be as high or as low as needed (e.g., Soltani 
& Wang, 2010; Yang & Shadlen, 2007), cue information can be weighted continuously, 
and so forth. Common analyses of weather prediction, too, facilitate flexible matching of 
statistics to experimental design. So long as a stable probability structure for the task can 
be crafted, and theoretically interesting hypotheses for how individuals solve the task can 
be specified, weather prediction tasks represent a well of potential for the experimental 
study of probabilistic cognition in humans and animals. 
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2 CORRELATIONAL, EXPERIMENTAL, AND COMPARATIVE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF WEATHER PREDICTION 
 Previous research programs have provided rich descriptions of different individual 
humans' brains and behaviors in a weather prediction task. What these studies cannot 
answer is the degree to which the strategy use is a trait of an individual that is stable across 
time, context, task manipulation, or other intraindividual factors. In the language of 
Cronbach (1957), much research has been done on the correlational psychology of 
weather prediction tasks and relatively little on their experimental psychology (Conway 
& Kovacs, 2013). Indeed, many designs are fundamentally correlational - how do different 
people with different neuronal structures, or different ages, or different diagnoses, solve 
the weather prediction task (see Table 2.1) - with titles that follow a discrete Mad Lib 
format: "How does [population] solve the weather prediction task" (Gluck et al., 2002; 
Meeter, et al., 2008; Whitham & Washburn, 2020).  
 The strategy analysis perspective often adopted by weather prediction researchers 
offers promise for an experimental psychology component in the form of the longitudinal 
tracking of participant strategy use. Whereas comparisons of the strategy-use trajectories 
of different participants, from different participant populations, is fundamentally a 
correlational psychology pursuit, that a trajectory of individual inferences - that is, a set 
of inferences made about cognition as it is manifest across experience - was charted in the 
first place is a nontrivial step toward understanding the intraindividual factors that guide 
probabilistic categorization. 
 Comparative psychology has much to offer to the study of outstanding questions 
about probabilistic cognition. Many of the characteristic behaviors that humans evidence 
in probabilistic decision-making tasks are present in animal species as well (Blanchard et 
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al., 2014; Klein et al., 2013; Mazur & Kahlbaugh, 2012; Watzek et al., 2018). Most species 
have not been demonstrated to monitor their own uncertainty, and are likely to engage 
processes of categorization and decision-making without actually evaluating the amount 
of uncertainty in their environment. That these species solve probabilistic categorization 
and decision-making tasks is tautology – they make decisions in their native 
environments, and their native environments are rife with probabilistic cues. But despite 
some animals’ demonstration of flexible, strategic leveraging of rule-based responses in 
other categorization tasks, they have rarely been previously studied in such terms (Smith 
et al., 2012). Furthermore, comparative psychology can offer a greater wealth of data from 
individuals within and across task manipulations, great potential for correlation of 
strategic behavior to other cognitive measures, and a window into the evolutionary 
trajectory of this fundamental cognitive competency. 
 Whitham and Washburn (2020) explored what patterns of responses nonhuman 
primates would spontaneously use to solve a classic weather prediction task. These 
monkeys were not constrained to ~200 trials of the task in an hour or less, like most 
weather prediction designs with humans, and therefore had their strategy use assessed at 
unprecedented levels of experience in the task. The authors adapted the weather 
prediction task of Gluck and colleagues (2002) for use with a computerized test system 
for nonhuman primates (the Language Research Center - Computerized Test System; 
Evans et al., 2008; Richardson et al., 1990). Cue information was disseminated via clipart 
images on a nearby computer screen, instead of via manipulable tarot card cues. Monkeys 
used a joystick apparatus to make a response towards one of two additional clipart images 
that acted as the binary response options ‘Sunny’ and ‘Rainy’. The authors maintained all 
probability and relative frequency information from Gluck, Shohamy, and Myers, with 
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the key difference that the overall exposure to the task was far greater (with many 
monkeys completing thousands of trials). 
 These monkeys followed a distinctly different trajectory of strategy use in 
probabilistic categorization tasks than do typical adult human participant populations 
(Whitham & Washburn, 2020). Whereas humans often transition smoothly from using 
responses that are not strategic to responses that depend on only a single item of cue 
information to (in some cases) responses that flexibly integrate multiple sources of cue 
information, many monkeys used no cue information at all in favor of other vaguely 
strategic responding (e.g., use of only one response per session). Many other monkeys 
were eventually best fit by a Single-Cue strategy that depended on the presence or absence 
of the same, single, highly-predictive cue, with some monkeys shifting to this strategy only 
after many hundreds of trials. No monkeys were consistently best fit by Singleton 
strategies (that respond optimally to any trial that has only one cue onscreen) or to 
strategies requiring integration of probabilistic information yielded by multiple cues. 
Most divergent from studies with healthy human adults, the monkeys adopted a strategy 
very quickly and adhered to it with incredible fidelity. No monkey smoothly transitioned 
from less sophisticated strategy use to more sophisticated strategy use (beyond the initial 
transition away from random responding). In this sense the monkeys’ strategy use was 
more like that of language-impaired children than typically-developing adults (although 
whether this apparent similarity is due to task motivation, cognitive similarities, both, or 
neither is an outstanding question; Kemény & Lukács, 2010),  
 Whitham and Washburn (2020) were the first to apply the strategy analyses of 
Meeter et al. (2006) to weather prediction task performance of animals. However, using 
relative probabilities of participant responses to specifically structured stimuli to yield 
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unique information about how participants learn and utilize the information with which 
they are presented is a classic technique in cognitive psychology. Indeed, weather 
prediction designs and analyses have much in common with identification and 
[deterministic] categorization designs that have played a crucial role in cognitive 
psychology's understanding of object identification and categorization processes (with 
weather prediction tasks taxonomized as "probabilistic categorization" here and 
elsewhere). These literatures even share the useful metaphor of stimulus representations 
and response probabilities as distributed in geometric (typically 2-dimensional, 
Euclidean) space (e.g., Ashby & Maddox, 2005). In each case, structure in the 
experimentally observed behaviors of an individual is used to reveal how an individual 
psychologically clustered the information they learned from the presented stimuli. 
 For example, multidimensional scaling has proven an exceptionally powerful tool 
for identifying these clusters and how they are distributed in different kinds of stimuli 
and by different individuals or groups. Shepard (1957, 1958) inaugurated the study of how 
minds represent physically different stimuli as conceptually so by innovating 
multidimensional scaling analyses for the metaphorical mapping of psychology to 
geometric space. This core conceit, initially relatively exploratory in scope, is among the 
most influential confluences of mathematics and psychology (Jaworska & Chupetlovska-
Anastasova, 2009). Multidimensional scaling underpins many influential models of 
human [deterministic] categorization (Nosofsky, 1992; Smith & Minda, 1998), and has 
been extended to considerations of decision-making utility and evolutionary optimality 
(Herbranson et al., 1999). In this way it can inform our understanding of the cognitive 
evolution of human and animal minds by quantifying the degree of similarity with which 
psychologically relevant clusters are distributed across taxa (Smith et al., 2012). 
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 Furthermore, the challenge faced by Whitham and Washburn (2020) of using 
nonverbal, behavioral measures to describe how animals complete tasks is endemic to 
comparative psychology and vital to its progress as a discipline. Rumbaugh (1971) 
described the ways in which the distribution of cognitive-behavioral data from disparate 
primate taxa were poorly accounted for by associative principles alone, and how 
percentage differences in percent correct in a simple learning task were better understood 
as the product of qualitatively different cognitive processes rather than of differences in 
parameters of associative value like learning rate. Cook, Brown, and Riley (1985) 
demonstrated differential leveraging of retrospective and prospective memory processes 
by rats as they completed radial arm mazes with interspersed interruptions. More 
generally, many of the scholars in comparative psychology’s long tradition of maze-
running designs have registered dissatisfaction with the limitations of using response 
latency or maze errors alone to describe the complex cognition evidenced by an animal in 
a maze, and sought alternative measures to offer a more complete account of how the 
animal completed the task (Fragaszy et al., 2003; Washburn, 1992). In these examples 
and many others, a premium is placed on accounts that appreciate psychology as a science 
of process-based accounts for psychological data and not ‘merely’ the rate at which 
animals can earn rewards in different kinds of tasks (Dutilh et al., 2019). 
 This dissertation will borrow liberally from these traditions in order to describe 
more fully the conditions in which rhesus macaques and capuchin monkeys adopt more 
optimal use of the provided probabilistic cues. This will allow us to better understand the 
processes that underpin a complex, ecologically-valid cognitive-behavioral task. These 
species have been previously used as an appropriate model for many high-level cognitive-
behavioral phenomena of interest, including analogical reasoning (Basile et al., 2015; 
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Flemming et al., 2011), self-control (Beran et al., 2016; Evans et al., 2014), artificial 
grammar abstraction (Wilson et al., 2013; Wilson et al., 2015), and many others. Each of 
these species contributes uniquely to this dissertation beyond their ability to complete 
many thousands of trials. Both species are hardy, long-lived, omnivorous primates with 
relatively large brains and highly complex social dynamics, with each of these features 
among the strongest predictors of sophisticated cognition in animals (Deaner et al., 2007; 
Dunbar & Schultz, 2007; Fragaszy et al., 2004; Lindburg, 1971). Comparison of Old World 
(i.e., macaque) and New World (i.e., capuchin) monkey species that diverged some 40 
million years ago may enrich our understanding of the evolution of the cognitive 
competencies that facilitate probabilistic cognition. Critically, the two species seem to 
vary in the degree to which they mobilize what would be called the more explicit, 
declarative aspects of cognition in dual-process typology. Hampton, Engelberg, and 
Brady (2020) reviewed a wealth of cognitive-behavioral data from rhesus macaques to 
conclude that these animals indeed have explicit dimensions to their cognition that are 
inconsistently engaged by experimental tasks, especially a restricted subset of memory, 
selective attention, and metacognition paradigms. Capuchin monkeys are often found to 
engage less successfully with this same set of memory, selective attention, and 
metacognition tasks (Basile et al., 2009; Beran et al., 2014; Beran et al., 2015; Beran & 
Smith, 2011). Newell, Lagnado, and Shanks (2007, reviewed above) convincingly 
demonstrated that, in humans, weather prediction tasks are principally rule-based and 
explicit. The apparent distinction between explicit cognition utilization of the two species, 
along with the greater trial experience the monkeys will receive, thus affords a unique 
description of the trajectory of rule-based responding as it evolves across low versus high 
levels of task experience for species with relatively lower and relatively higher degrees of 
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explicit cognition. These pre-existing group differences set up interesting comparisons 
which are complementary to more focal hypotheses about the underpinnings of 
probabilistic cognition. 
 By better understanding the network of individual predictors and task conditions 
associated with different patterns of performance on the weather prediction task, we may 
better understand the processes involved in the real-life situation for which the weather 
prediction task is a sincere model. By understanding predictors of more optimal 
responding specifically, we may more fully understand how to elicit more sophisticated 
response patterns to the situations modeled by weather prediction tasks. Finally, the 
inferences about probabilistic categorization gleaned by the exceedingly large trial counts 
and statistical precision afforded by comparative psychology may be applied to renewed 
explorations of how optimal responding may be encouraged in humans. In particular, it 
is unclear what has limited the ability of humans and other animals to make decisions 
that make use of more of the available cue evidence in previous weather prediction tasks. 
One possibility is that the 30 to 60 minute experimental sessions that human participants 
complete in typical weather prediction designs yields too few exposures to the embedded 
probabilistic relationships of the task, and that this restricts the range and complexity of 
strategy use. Although studies that offer humans more comprehensive experience with 
the task have not been published, the comparative data of Whitham and Washburn 
(2020) demonstrated very little continued elaboration of strategy use after initial strategy 
adoption. For monkeys, at least, the more fundamental determinant of behavior must be 
more cognitive, perceptual, motivational, or procedural. A comprehensive evaluation of 
the evidence for each of these possibilities may guide both the basic science of 
probabilistic cognition and application of this science wherever inferences are made. 
31 
 
2.1 Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was designed as a set of conceptual replications of Whitham and 
Washburn (2020) to explore the extent to which strategy use by an animal was consistent 
across mechanically identical weather prediction tasks. Rhesus macaques (Macaca 
mulatta) and capuchin monkeys (Cebus [Sapajus] apella) completed five iterations of a 
computerized adaptation of the cognitive-behavioral weather prediction task of Gluck, 
Shohamy, and Myers (2002), with each iteration using a different set of onscreen stimuli 
for each cue and response. If cognitive strategy use during probabilistic categorization 
was indeed a reliable trait of an individual, strategy analysis should reveal a similar set of 
strategies for the same animal across each iteration of the task. If responses were 
qualitatively changed by the practice that five iterations of the design might afford, 
disproportionately guided by early experience in the task, or demonstrably unstructured 
across the animals' experience with the task, strategy analysis should reveal no such 
consistency. 
 
H0: The null hypothesis for each of the succeeding experiments suggests that strategy 
use is the product of random sampling from a population-level distribution of strategies 
and their frequencies, and that the strategy adopted in each new task by each monkey 
is a random draw from that distribution. 
 
Hypothesis I: Strategy use during probabilistic categorization is a stable trait of an 
individual animal, and the same strategies used by an animal in one weather prediction 
task will be those used in another task. 
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2.2 Experiment 2 
In contrast, Experiment 2 was a set of directly theory-motivated attempts to upset 
any consistent strategy use observed in Experiment 1 and to encourage use of multicue 
strategies. Experiments 2a, 2b, and 2c assessed the degree to which strategy use by the 
animals was dictated by parameters of rote associative evaluation like reward rate. 
Optimal foraging theory, monkeys' behavior in other cognitive-behavioral computer 
games, and motivational/associative theory converge to predict that when additional 
cognitive or motoric effort is required to acquire primary reinforcement, organisms are 
likely to adjust their behavior to meet that challenge (in a way consistent with their species 
and individual powers; Blanchard & Hayden, 2015; Kangas et al., 2016; Ross & 
Winterhalder, 2015; Washburn & Rumbaugh, 1992). In probabilistic decision-making 
designs with humans, the nature of strategy use has been demonstrated to change with 
endogenous motivation (Giner-Sorolila & Chaiken, 1997). As the reward rate for chance 
performance is made less and less lucrative, any animals that had not previously 
demonstrated above-chance performance on the weather prediction task should adopt a 
strategy that will yield a success rate that maintains the animal at the individual reward 
rate it expects of its tasks. It is possible that some animals may use more complex, 
multicue strategies to maximize a decremented reward rate, but this is unlikely in weather 
prediction designs in which single-cue and multicue strategies are nearly equivalently 
successful. 
 
Hypothesis II: Behavior in weather prediction tasks is guided by factors other than an 
individual's preferred strategy, and titration of overall reward rate in the task will alter 
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strategy use accordingly. Specifically, the animals that used Random or Side-Bias 
strategies in Experiment 1 will use cue information to guide responding in Experiments 
2a, 2b, and 2c. 
 
Experiments 2d and 2e similarly probed the degree to which another relationship 
of fundamentally associative value – that of the reward frequency of responses in the 
presence of the different cues – guided strategy use. Nearly every previous weather 
prediction design has used the table of cue validities and probabilities introduced by 
Experiment 2 of Gluck, Shohamy, and Myers (2002) (e.g., Meeter et al., 2006; Newell et 
al., 2007; Shohamy et al., 2008). Although this makes the differential psychology of 
weather prediction easier (see Table 2.1) by facilitating comparisons across groups on the 
same task, other probability tables may be crafted that might yield different strategy use 
trajectories. As the amount of information yielded by each cue becomes more similar, 
multicue strategies (especially those that optimize according cue information) may 
become relatively more attractive whereas single-cue strategies become relatively less so. 
As above, we would expect the animals' behavior in the task to change accordingly. 
 
Hypothesis III: Behavior in weather prediction tasks is guided by factors other than an 
individual's preferred strategy, and a set of more egalitarian cue probabilities will beget 
greater multicue responding in the animals that readily use strategies. Animals that do 
not readily use strategies will revert to Random or Side-biased strategies. 
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2.3 Experiment 3 
 In Experiment 2, each manipulation of psychological significance was titrated 
exactly by the experimenter to test theory-motivated hypotheses. In contrast, the 
manipulations included in Experiment 3 were exploratory and designed to probe 
theoretically interesting questions about the nature of probabilistic categorization in 
animals. Note that throughout Experiment 3, manipulation checks of whether monkeys 
perceived the stimuli in the intended manner were not readily available.  
 Monkeys process complex visual stimuli locally, via their more minute features, 
rather than globally via the whole stimulus array in its entirety (Hopkins & Washburn, 
2002; Spinozzi et al., 2003). In the task of Whitham and Washburn (2020), the cue 
information was distributed across the computer screen such that animals might 
reasonably have only processed one cue or region of the screen each trial. To test whether 
animals might more optimally integrate cue information when local processing of this 
kind is discouraged, Experiment 3a explored strategy use by monkeys to a weather 
prediction task in which the cue information was presented in such a way that this local 
processing bias could be minimized. In Experiment 3a, simple cue images appeared in 
close spatial proximity. Another way to manipulate local processing biases of the monkeys 
may be to present the cue information in a context in which monkeys have been 
demonstrated to process information more globally, like illusory motion or faces (Leopold 
& Rhodes, 2010; Taubert et al., 2017). Experiment 3b oriented the probabilistic cue 
information as a face that the animals might be more likely to process holistically.  
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Hypothesis IV: Utilization of cues is, in part, a perceptual process, and design 
considerations that have been demonstrated to engender multicue perception will 
engender multicue strategy use. 
 
 Similarly, many cognitive processes are seemingly deployed differently in social 
contexts than they are in nonsocial contexts (Jack et al., 2013). Moreover, weather 
prediction tasks can be understood to mimic problems presented in many social decision-
making situations. For example, a socially subordinate monkey assessing whether or not 
an attempt to exploit food resources would be punished by dominant conspecifics would 
do well to assess probabilistic information yielded by the number and identities of nearby 
conspecifics, the direction of conspecifics' gazes, the severity of recent aggression events, 
and so forth. Although a computerized task struggles to model such a context exactly, an 
exploration of whether strategy use is sharper (or duller) when cues resemble highly 
salient, socially interesting information is a natural extension of the present research. 
Experiments 3c and 3d provided animals with weather prediction tasks in which the 
predictive cues were photographs of conspecific faces and bodies, respectively.  
 
Hypothesis V: Utilization of cues is, in part, a perceptual process, and cues that are 
qualitatively different than those of other experiments (socially interesting rather than 
asocial; discrete rather than abstract; inherently salient rather than sterilely 
controlled) should engender qualitatively different strategy use. 
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2.4 Experiment 4 
 Because many monkeys did not use cue information in Experiments 1, 2, or 3, the 
reward rate manipulations of Experiments 2a, 2b, and 2c were extended even further. The 
hypotheses and rationale for this manipulation were unchanged from Experiment 2. 
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Table 2.1 Correlational Psychology of Weather Prediction 
 
Diagnosis Citation Clinical N Performance deficit? 
Alzheimer's 
disorder 
Eldridge, Masterman, & 
Knowlton, 2002 
8 No performance deficit, declarative knowledge of task 
environment impaired. 
Anterograde 
amnesia 
Knowlton, Squire, & Gluck, 
1994 
8 Performance deficit appears only late in testing, declarative 
knowledge of task environment impaired. 
Knowlton, Squire, & Mangels, 
1996 
12 Performance deficit appears only late in testing, declarative 
knowledge of task environment impaired. 
Speekenbrink, Channon, & 
Shanks, 2008 
9 No performance deficit, declarative knowledge of task 
environment intact. 
Meeter et al., 2006 7 Deficit to ability to utilize and elaborate response strategy. 
Developmental 
dyslexia 
Gabay, Vakil, Schiff, & Holt, 
2015 
15 Performance deficits throughout testing on weather prediction 
tasks both with and without trial-by-trial feedback. 
Parkinson's 
disorder 
Knowlton, Squire, & Mangels, 
1996 
20 Performance deficits throughout testing, declarative knowledge 
of task environment intact. 
Moody, Bookheimer, Vanek, 
& Knowlton, 2004 
8 No performance deficit, declarative knowledge of task 
environment intact. 
Specific 
language 
impairment 
Kemény & Lukács, 2010 16 Performance deficits throughout testing. 
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3 METHODS 
3.1 Participants 
Seven rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) and twenty capuchin monkeys (Cebus 
[Sapajus] apella) housed at the Language Research Center of Georgia State University 
took part in the series of experiments. Due to time and testing constraints, and differences 
in monkeys’ enthusiasm for the task, every animal did not complete every experiment 
(specific participant numbers will be reported in the Results chapter). Each animal had 
an extensive history participating in computerized cognitive-behavioral research on tasks 
that probed the cognitive and comparative psychology of phenomena as diverse as 
perception of visual illusions (e.g., Parrish et al., 2015), self control (e.g., Evans et al., 
2014), metacognition (e.g., Smith et al., 2010), and behavioral economics (Parrish et al., 
2014). Many of these animals (~41%) also participated in the weather prediction task of 
Whitham and Washburn (2020). 
Capuchin monkeys were housed in small social groups of 2 to 9 animals in large 
indoor enclosures with attached outdoor enclosures. Each morning, animals were given 
the opportunity to voluntarily separate from their main enclosure and social group into a 
smaller, testing enclosure. Any animal that voluntarily separated was given access to a 
testing apparatus for four to six hours before being returned to their main enclosure and 
social group. Rhesus macaques were single-housed in indoor enclosures with daily access 
to an outdoor play area. Testing apparatus was available to each animal 23-24 hours per 
day, six days per week. Animals with a socially-compatible conspecific often spent one 
hour each day in their outside play area with that conspecific and without access to testing 
apparatus.  
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Animals were not food- or water-deprived at any time for testing purposes, and 
elected to participate in the task or pursue other activities at their individual discretion. 
All animals were maintained on a nutritionally-complete diet of nuts, fruits, vegetables, 
and commercial primate food independently of their participation in any research 
activities. All research protocols were approved by an Institutional Animal Care and Use 
Committee. 
 
3.2 Apparatus and General Procedure 
Animals were tested using an adapted version of the Language Research Center - 
Computerized Test System (Evans et al., 2008; Richardson et al., 1990). Computer-
generated stimuli were presented to the animal on a computer monitor positioned just 
outside the animal's testing enclosure. Animals responded to these stimuli using a joystick 
mounted inside their testing enclosure (capuchin monkeys) or within an arm's reach 
outside of their enclosure (rhesus macaques). Each correct joystick response to onscreen 
stimuli was rewarded with a 45 mg banana-flavored primate pellet and an ascending tone 
played from a speaker adjacent to the computer monitor. Each incorrect response caused 
a buzzing tone to be played from the same speaker, and no food reward to be dispensed. 
For each new manipulation in each experiment, new images for cues and outcomes were 
used and new spatial locations for cues and outcomes were assigned. 
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3.3 Experimental Procedures 
3.3.1 Experiment 1 Procedures 
Monkeys completed a computerized version of the classic weather prediction task 
of Gluck and colleagues (2002). On each trial, one, two, or three of four total cues 
simultaneously appeared onscreen as computer-generated visual images. The animal 
responded to these cues via a joystick deflection to one of two responses (R or S), also 
denoted onscreen as computer-generated images (Figure 3.1). 
Critically, the cues combined to offer incomplete, probabilistic evidence about 
which of the two responses would be rewarded (see Table 3.1). These probabilities were 
structured such that each cue appeared equally often in each 200 trial block and each 
response was rewarded equally often. Cues 1, 2, 3, and 4 were associated with Response 
R being rewarded at validities .2, .4, .6, and .8, respectively. 
A 1-second intertrial interval elapsed after correct responses, and a 4-second 
intertrial interval elapsed after incorrect responses. After each 1,000 completed trials, the 
images associated with cues and outcomes were replaced with new images, and the spatial 
orientations of the cues were reassigned (i.e., if the leftmost cue was cue 3 for the first 
1,000 trials, it might cease to be so in subsequent experiments). Experiment 1 concluded 
after 5,000 trials and five sets of images for cues and outcomes. 
 
3.3.2 Experiment 2 Procedures 
3.3.2.1 Experiment 2abc Procedures. 
Monkeys completed 1,000 trials of the design described in Experiment 1 for each of three 
new sets of response contingencies. In Experiment 2a, 4 seconds elapsed after correct 
41 
responses and 6 seconds elapsed after incorrect responses. In Experiment 2b, 5 seconds 
elapsed after correct responses and 8 seconds elapsed after incorrect responses. In 
Experiment 2c, 6 seconds elapsed after correct responses and 10 seconds elapsed after 
incorrect responses. These manipulations changed the overall reward rate of the task, in 
attempts to change the strategy use of the animals accordingly. 
 
3.3.2.2 Experiment 2d Procedures. 
Monkeys completed 1,000 trials of the design described in Experiment 1 with a 
modified probability table (Table 3.2). Cues 1, 2, 3, and 4 were associated with Response 
R at validities .28, .41, .59, and .72, respectively. This manipulation changed the relative 
information yielded by each cue, in an attempt to change the strategy use of the animals 
accordingly. 
 
3.3.2.3 Experiment 2e Procedures. 
Monkeys completed 1,000 trials of the design described in Experiment 1 with a 
modified probability table (Table 3.3). Cues 1, 2, 3, and 4 were associated with Response 
R at validities .33, .45, .55, and .67, respectively. 
 
3.3.3 Experiment 3 Procedures 
3.3.3.1 Experiment 3a Procedures. 
Monkeys completed 1,000 trials of the design described in Experiment 1 but with 
cues oriented such that they are spatially contiguous (Figure 3.2).  
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3.3.3.2 Experiment 3b Procedures. 
Monkeys completed 1,000 trials of the design described in Experiment 1 but with 
cues that were oriented as features on the face of a computerized version of a popular 
vegetable face man toy (Figure 3.3). Other weather prediction designs have used these 
toys as stimuli with human participants (e.g., Meeter et al., 2006; Shohamy et al., 2008). 
 
3.3.3.3 Experiment 3c Procedures. 
Monkeys completed 1,000 trials of the design described in Experiment 1 but public 
domain photographs of conspecific faces as cues. The animals depicted in the 
photographs were not familiar to any of the tested animals. 
 
3.3.3.4  Experiment 3d Procedures. 
 Monkeys completed 1,000 trials of the design described in Experiment 1 but with 
public domain photographs of conspecific bodies as cues. The animals depicted in the 
photographs were not familiar to any of the tested animals. 
 
3.3.4 Experiment 4 Procedures 
Monkeys completed 1,000 trials of the design described in Experiment 1 for each 
of four new sets of response contingencies. In Experiment 4a, 2 seconds elapsed after 
correct responses and 6 seconds elapsed after incorrect responses. In Experiment 4b, 3 
seconds elapsed after correct responses and 8 seconds elapsed after incorrect responses. 
In Experiment 4c, 4 seconds elapsed after correct responses and 10 seconds elapsed after 
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incorrect responses. In Experiment 4d, 4 seconds elapsed after correct responses and 14 
seconds elapsed after incorrect responses. 
 
3.3.5 Methods Summary 
The proposed sequence of experiments promised greater depth of experimental 
exploration (via the wealth of data comparative psychology can offer) and greater breadth 
of experimental manipulation (via the diversity of intraindividual designs that 
experimental psychology can offer) than any previous experimentation with the uniquely 
ecologically valid weather prediction task (see Table 3.4). How individuals independently 
come to conclude that available evidence is relatively strong or weak and how it may be 
associated with the true state of the universe is a fundamental, pressing issue for cognitive 
psychology.
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Table 3.1 Probability Structure of Experiment 1 
 
Cue 
Pattern 
Cue 1 
Present? 
Cue 2 
Present? 
Cue 3 
Present? 
Cue 4 
Present? 
Times Response 
R Rewarded 
Times Response 
S Rewarded 
Pattern 
appearances per 
200 trials 
A 0 0 0 1 17 2 19 
B 0 0 1 0 7 2 9 
C 0 0 1 1 24 2 26 
D 0 1 0 0 2 7 9 
E 0 1 0 1 10 2 12 
F 0 1 1 0 3 3 6 
G 0 1 1 1 17 2 19 
H 1 0 0 0 2 17 19 
I 1 0 0 1 3 3 6 
J 1 0 1 0 2 10 12 
K 1 0 1 1 5 4 9 
L 1 1 0 0 2 24 26 
M 1 1 0 1 4 5 9 
N 1 1 1 0 2 17 19 
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Table 3.2 Probability Structure of Experiment 2d 
 
Cue 
Pattern 
Cue 1 
Present? 
Cue 2 
Present? 
Cue 3 
Present? 
Cue 4 
Present? 
Times Response 
R Rewarded 
Times Response 
S Rewarded 
Pattern 
appearances per 
200 trials 
A 0 0 0 1 16 3 19 
B 0 0 1 0 6 3 9 
C 0 0 1 1 21 5 26 
D 0 1 0 0 3 6 9 
E 0 1 0 1 7 5 12 
F 0 1 1 0 3 3 6 
G 0 1 1 1 16 3 19 
H 1 0 0 0 3 16 19 
I 1 0 0 1 3 3 6 
J 1 0 1 0 5 7 12 
K 1 0 1 1 5 4 9 
L 1 1 0 0 5 21 26 
M 1 1 0 1 4 5 9 
N 1 1 1 0 3 16 19 
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Table 3.3 Probability Structure of Experiment 2e 
 
Cue 
Pattern 
Cue 1 
Present? 
Cue 2 
Present? 
Cue 3 
Present? 
Cue 4 
Present? 
Times Response 
R Rewarded 
Times Response 
S Rewarded 
Pattern 
appearances per 
200 trials 
A 0 0 0 1 14 5 19  
B 0 0 1 0 5 4 9  
C 0 0 1 1 19 7 26  
D 0 1 0 0 4 5 9  
E 0 1 0 1 8 4 12  
F 0 1 1 0 3 3 6  
G 0 1 1 1 14 5 19  
H 1 0 0 0 5 14 19  
I 1 0 0 1 3 3 6  
J 1 0 1 0 4 8 12  
K 1 0 1 1 5 4 9  
L 1 1 0 0 7 19 26  
M 1 1 0 1 4 5 9  
N 1 1 1 0 5 14 19  
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Table 3.4 Experimental Psychology of Weather Prediction 
 
Confirmatory / 
Exploratory Experiment Manipulation Hypothesis 
Confirmatory Experiment 1abcde Within-experiment 
replication, practice 
with task 
Hypothesis I: Strategy use during probabilistic categorization is a trait of 
an individual animal, and the same strategies used by an animal in one 
weather prediction task will be those used in another task. 
Experiment 2abc, 
4abcd 
Reward rate for 
chance responding 
decremented 
Hypothesis II: Behavior in weather prediction tasks is guided by factors 
other than an individual's preferred strategy, and titration of overall 
reward rate in the task will titrate strategy use accordingly. Specifically, 
the animals that use Random or Side-Bias strategies in Experiment 1 will 
use cue information to guide responding in Experiments 2a, 2b, and 2c. 
Experiment 2de Cue validities 
decremented 
Hypothesis III: Behavior in weather prediction tasks is guided by factors 
other than an individual's preferred strategy, and a set of task 
probabilities that demands multicue responding to maintain high reward 
rates will beget such responding in the animals that readily use strategies. 
Animals that do not readily use strategies will revert to Random or Side-
biased strategies. 
Exploratory Experiment 3a Cues spatially 
contiguous 
Hypothesis IV: Utilization of cues is, in part, a perceptual process, and 
design considerations that have been demonstrated to engender multicue 
perception will engender multicue strategy use. 
Experiment 3b Cues as face 
Experiment 3cd Socially-interesting 
cues 
Hypothesis V: Utilization of cues is, in part, a perceptual process, and cues 
that are qualitatively different than those of other experiments (socially-
interesting rather than asocial; discrete rather than abstract; inherently 
salient rather than sterilely controlled) should engender qualitatively 
different strategy use. 
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Figure 3.1 Demonstration of task screen for Experiments 1, 2, and 4. Cues, responses, and joystick-controlled cursor 
are labeled for clarity. All four cues are presented together only for demonstration purposes, as this pattern will not 
appear in any experiment. 
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Figure 3.2 Demonstration of task screen for Experiment 3a 
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Figure 3.3 Demonstration of task screen for Experiment 3b 
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4 RESULTS 
4.1 Analysis Plan 
 Whitham and Washburn's (2020) elaboration of the strategy-analysis technique of 
Meeter and colleagues (2006) was used to analyze data from each experiment. In such an 
analysis, each of an arbitrary number of possible response strategies that an animal might 
employ to complete the task is expressed formally as a model for the observed data, then 
model selection procedures are used to identify which of the strategies/models best 
accounts for the data. Any hypothetical strategy that can predict consistent responses to 
each cue pattern can be specified and tested. I tested the wide range of easily verbalizable 
strategies that was previously probed by Whitham and Washburn (2020).  
 Table 4.1 describes many of the strategies that humans and monkeys might use to 
solve the task. These strategies vary greatly in their cognitive and computational 
complexity. Some strategies predicted use of no cue information at all (e.g., Random, S or 
R Biases). Other strategies predicted responses on the basis of only a single cue (e.g., 
Singleton, Single-cue). Still other strategies predicted that the probabilistic information 
yielded by multiple cues would be synthesized suboptimally (e.g., Singleton-Prototype, 
Two v One, All but Two Strong Cards). Finally, a Perfect response strategy predicted that 
the optimal response will be made to each of the cue patterns. Because we expected that 
monkeys might adopt side biases when the strategy that they adopted does not offer a 
specific prediction, rather than choosing among the responses randomly, side-biased 
variants of many of the strategies were included. For example, a Singleton strategy 
predicted that the animal would make optimal responses any time a single cue was 
onscreen, and choose at chance otherwise; the side biased variants instead predicted that 
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the animal would make optimal responses any time a single cue is onscreen and make 
side-biased R or S responses otherwise.  
 The specific predictions made by each strategy, to each cue pattern, are listed in 
Table 4.2. Even an individual that adopted a strategy exactly as it is described in Table 
4.2, however, would be very unlikely to make every predicted response to each iteration 
of the various cue patterns. Perseverative or motoric errors, probability matching 
behaviors, and exploration of the problem space are but a few of the reasons why an 
individual might have deviated from the predicted response (Shanks et al., 2002; 
Speekenbrink et al., 2008). To account for this, the rate at which forecasted responses 
were made to cue patterns was instead described via an adherence rate parameter. Meeter 
and colleagues (2006), who innovated this approach with human participants, fixed the 
adherence rate parameter at .95. This indicates that individuals made responses 
consistent with the strategy they were understood to have adopted 95% of the time. 
Despite the apparent incongruity between inadherent monkeys and very high predicted 
adherence, the .95 adherence rate remained a sensible choice. Meeter and colleagues 
reported simulation data that suggested that even when simulated participants adhered 
to a strategy on fewer than 95% of trials, a .95 adherence rate did a superior job of 
correctly identifying the strategy that was used to simulate the data. Lee (2016) reported 
that in similar strategy analyses of human behavioral data, adherence is reliably very high. 
Although the monkeys’ decremented attention and propensity for perseverative errors 
with the joystick, to name two likely species differences, may have made them unlikely to 
adhere to a strategy so closely as do humans, assuming high adherence is the 
recommendation from both simulation and comparative cognition perspectives. 
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 Each 40 trials completed by an animal was analyzed as a separate block. The fit of 
a strategy to each of these 40 trials blocks was estimated in the following manner. First, 
the binomial likelihood of seeing x S responses in n exposures to a cue pattern when the 
probability of an S response is .95, .05, or .5 (see Table 4.2) was computed. Such a 
likelihood was computed for each cue pattern that an animal was exposed to in those 40 
trials (typically all cue patterns, for 14 likelihoods). Next, the product of these likelihoods 
was used to describe the extent to which that strategy was a good fit to the 40 trials. These 
two steps were repeated for each of the 25 probable strategies that were specified. The 
greatest value among these products (corresponding to the lowest Akaike's Information 
Criteria value; Akaike, 1974) was taken as the best fitting strategy for that set of trials. 
These steps were repeated for each block of 40 trials in an experiment, for every other 
experiment, and for every monkey. After the likeliest strategies were identified, inferences 
about strategy use trends were then assessed via analyses of strategy frequencies within 
and across experiments and animals, estimation of stability of strategy from block to 
block, visualization of strategy adoption/maintenance, and other analyses. 
 The optimal number of trials used to identify strategy use via this analysis, with 
these species, is unclear. Use of many trials would facilitate stronger fits of strategies to 
data when strategy use is consistent, because the influence of rare strategy inadherence 
on strategy fit is diluted. However, taking many trials as model input when strategy use is 
more inconsistent risks the model attempting to label use of multiple strategies as a single 
strategy. On the other end of the continuum, use of too few trials prevents the analysis 
from making accurate identifications in the first place. The sample size of 40 trials that 
this analysis plan takes as model input is informed by simulated data analyses reported 
by Meeter and colleagues (2006) and Whitham and Washburn (2020). This represents a 
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relative “Goldilocks number” at which the model input is neither too large (and risks 
misidentifying heterogeneous use of multiple strategies as a single strategy) nor too small 
(thwarting accurate strategy identification). Figure 4.1 shows the ability of the analysis 
perfectly or near-perfectly to recover the strategy used to simulate the data when high 
adherence is assumed. Accurate strategy recovery is reliably very high, with only the 
Perfect strategies (that make the most specific predictions) not always easily recovered 
from samples of 40 trials. 
 
4.2 Descriptive Analyses 
The probabilistic nature of weather prediction tasks divorces an animal’s 
responding from the feedback contingencies for completing a trial correctly. An animal 
can make the optimal response that is most likely to dispense a reward, but receive no 
reward. The proportion of trials in which a reward was received can be useful in some 
modeling contexts in which rewards are the molecular unit of learning. More useful for 
this study was a measure of optimal responding that described the rate at which the 
animal made the response that was most likely to cause a pellet to be dispensed. Such a 
measure describes, post-hoc, mature animal learning in the task. Greater-than-chance 
use of the optimal response suggests structured learning of the relationships among cues, 
responses, and outcomes.  
Figure 4.2 presents a visualization of the proportion of trials in which an animal 
made the optimal response in each block, of each experiment, by each monkey. Each cell 
describes an experiment (i.e., Experiment 1a, Experiment 1b, etc.), with the proportion of 
trials in which the optimal response was made to all cue patterns on the y-axis of the cell 
(ranging from no use of the optimal response to 100% use of the optimal response), 
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successive blocks presented along the x-axis of the cell, and a dashed line denoting chance 
use of the optimal response. Heavy black lines denote borders between Experiments 1, 2, 
3, and 4. Different line colors were used based on the number of experiments completed 
by a monkey. Monkey names are listed on the y-axis of the figure.  
Tables 4.3-6 report additional descriptive statistics for Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4, 
respectively. The grand mean and standard deviation of the proportion of trials the 
optimal response was made were computed using the observed proportions of each of the 
25 blocks of 40 trials (25 x 40 = 1,000 blocks per experiment). The grand mean and 
standard deviation of response latency (time between stimulus onset and response, with 
outliers >7 sec removed) were computed in the same manner. 
Many animals (e.g., Han, Hank) never deviated from chance use of the optimal 
response. Many other animals (e.g., Albert throughout Experiment 2, Ingrid and Griffin 
throughout Experiments 1 and 2) demonstrated use of optimal responses at chance rates 
in early blocks of an experiment but at much higher rates as the experiment continued. 
The plotted data often form a characteristic, “lowercase m” shape. These individuals 
seemingly learned something of the relationships among cues, responses, and outcomes, 
with optimal response rates increasing over time as a result. When these relationships 
changed at the start of a new experiment, optimal response rates returned to chance and 
the animal began the learning process anew. The descriptive data suggest that many 
animals learned to use the optimal response at above-chance levels within the various 
experiments.  
Visual inspection and conventional statistical analyses of these optimal response 
proportions in comparison to chance only inconsistently describes how these animals 
solved the task. For example, a multilevel logistic regression model could estimate the 
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effects of individual differences, cue information, task experience, and any number of 
other variables on likelihood of selecting one response or another. This analysis would 
output correlation coefficients for individual parameters and individual animals, and 
faithfully identify experiments in which observed use of the optimal response differed 
from chance. But such an analysis would strain to effectively describe the root cause of a 
network of correlation coefficients. That a monkey learned to use the optimal response in 
Experiment 2a, then again in Experiment 2b, is largely tangential to the question of how, 
qualitatively, the animal completed the task. The strategy analyses, however, can identify 
these more qualitative differences. 
 
4.3 Experiment 1 Strategy Analysis 
Twenty capuchin monkeys and seven rhesus macaques finished Experiment 1, 
combining to produce 594 blocks of responses that used cue information in an identifiably 
strategic way. A visualization of the best fit strategies for each block of responses by each 
monkey is presented in Figure 4.3. Cue-based strategies were overwhelmingly those that 
used one cue to guide all responses. Many monkeys used a Single-cue Strong strategy in 
which one response was made when a specific high validity cue was present, and the 
opposite response was made otherwise. At other times the Strong Singleton strategy was 
adopted, in which optimal responses were made only when one of the cues with highest 
predictive validity was the only cue presented. 
Although this experiment functioned as a series of replications of Whitham and 
Washburn (2020), some patterns of responding were markedly different. Use of [Strong] 
Singleton strategies was not reported in that design, but was evidenced by several 
monkeys that used cue-based strategies in Experiment 1 (none of these monkeys was 
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included in the previous weather prediction design). The strategies used by those 
monkeys that used cue-based strategies did not change across the five iterations of the 
task. 
 
4.4 Experiment 2 Strategy Analysis 
Ten capuchin monkeys and seven rhesus macaques finished Experiment 2, in 
which ITIs, timeouts, and cue validities were adjusted. These animals combined to 
produce 274 blocks of responses that used cue information in an identifiably strategic 
way. A visualization of the best fit strategies for each block of responses by each monkey 
is presented in Figure 4.4. These [null] effects are noteworthy because, unlike in the 
mechanically identical manipulations of Experiment 1, Experiments 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, and 
2e each manipulated either the reward rate or the validities of the cues. Importantly, there 
was no evidence for a change in strategy distribution towards new or more sophisticated 
strategy use was observed with these changes, and the rate of non-Single Cue strategy use 
remained very low. Changes to reward rate and cue validity also did not cause higher rates 
of cue-based strategy use. One capuchin monkey, Lily, that used cues strategically in 
Experiment 1 ceased to do so in Experiment 2, while a second capuchin monkey, Albert, 
started using cue information strategically in Experiment 2 after not doing so in 
Experiment 1.  
Curiously, both Griffin (capuchin) and Ingrid’s (capuchin) Single Cue Strong 
strategy adoption was strongest when the validity of the strong cues was weakest, in 
Experiment 2e. The reasons for this are unclear, and may represent artifacts of fitful data 
collection, but this result minimally demonstrates that the more equivalent validities of 
the four cues in Experiments 2d and 2e were tractable to the animals. That is, even though 
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the animals overwhelming used single, strongly predictive cues to guide cue-based 
strategy use, and even though these experiments presented strongly predictive cues that 
were not as strong as in other experiments, these animals still made reliable use of single-
cue strategies. This is a novel demonstration, given that manipulation of cue validities is 
very rare in probabilistic categorization designs, and that the cue validities and 
probability table of Gluck, Shohamy, and Myers (2002) (see Table 3.1) has been used in 
nearly every published probabilistic categorization task. 
 
4.5 Experiment 3 Strategy Analysis 
Nine capuchin monkeys and seven rhesus macaques finished Experiment 3, in 
which the cues were spatially contiguous or were depicted as photographs of conspecific 
faces or bodies. Together, these animals combined to produce 197 blocks of responses that 
used cue information in an identifiably strategic way. A visualization of the best fit 
strategies for each block of responses by each monkey is presented in Figure 4.5. The 
responses of each of Griffin (capuchin), Ingrid (capuchin), and Obi (rhesus) were 
consistently best fit in this experiment by strategies that use multiple cues, with the three 
animals best fit by these strategies ~93%, ~92%, and ~85% of blocks in the latter half of 
Experiment 3a, respectively. 
Obi was identified as using a Singleton-Prototype strategy that, despite inclusion 
in analyses of Meeter and colleagues (2006, 2008) and Whitham and Washburn (2020), 
had never been previously reported to be a good fit to human or animal probabilistic 
categorization data. The Singleton-Prototype strategy predicted optimal responses to cue 
combinations in which only one cue was onscreen, or those in which two cues were 
onscreen that predicted the same response. A restricted subset of these rhesus macaques 
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had taken part in many thousands of discrete categorization tasks with spatially localized, 
polygonal stimuli of similar appearance to those of Experiment 3a, and Obi’s data are 
often strongly represented in these designs (e.g., Smith et al., 2012). Obi may have been 
uniquely sensitive to this manipulation, and non-representative of strategy use in weather 
prediction tasks.  
But this fact of the animals' experimental history was not true of Ingrid and Griffin. 
Instead, presenting the cues more locally may have caused a greater proportion of the cue 
information to be attended to among these three animals that, across all experiments, 
were generally more attentive to the task overall. The spatially localized, polygonal cues 
of Experiment 3a may have facilitated slightly more global processing of the cues and their 
associated validities, as intended. Besides the aforementioned cue-based strategy use in 
Experiment 3a, the experimental manipulations of Experiment 3 had no effect on the 
distribution or speed of cue-based strategy use. Instead, use of the more unfamiliar 
stimulus images in the rest of Experiment 3 seemed to be less interesting or tractable to 
the animals, and strategic use of cues was nearly entirely absent. 
 
4.6 Experiment 4 Strategy Analysis 
Five capuchin monkeys and seven rhesus macaques finished Experiment 4, which 
extended the ITI and timeous manipulations of Experiment 2. These animals combined 
to produce 246 blocks of responses that used cue information in an identifiably strategic 
way. A visualization of the best fit strategies for each block of responses by each monkey 
is presented in Figure 4.6. Experiment 4’s extension of Experiment 2’s reward rate 
manipulations resulted in cue-based strategy use by five monkeys – Applesauce 
(capuchin), Irene (capuchin), Murph (rhesus), Liam (capuchin), and Lou (rhesus) - that 
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had not demonstrated any appreciable degree of strategy use in Experiments 1, 2, or 3 
(Liam, capuchin, used the Single-Cue strategy in unpublished data from the experiment 
of Whitham & Washburn, 2020). The changes to these animals’ performance was limited 
to their adoption of strategies that other animals used in previous experiments. The 
manipulations did not speed up the rate of strategy adoption, nor did they cause adoption 
of cue-based strategies that were new to this series of experiments. 
The strategy analysis (and descriptive data, see Figure 4.2 and Table 4.6) suggests 
strongly that Obi (rhesus) used multicue strategies in Experiment 4. In the latter halves 
of Experiments 4a, 4b, 4c, and 4d, Obi was best fit by multicue strategies ~71% of the time 
overall. However, successive blocks were rarely identified as the product of the same 
strategy (hence the paucity of plotted points in Figure 4.6, which only depicts multiple 
identical strategy identifications in a row). Without this control against strategy 
misidentification, the specific implications of this result can only be evaluated with 
caution. There are a few reasons why the strategy analysis may have reported such a 
diversity of multicue strategy use. Obi might have indeed changed strategies very rapidly 
among the multicue strategies, and the strategy analysis faithfully captured this suite of 
strategy use. Such a demonstration would be novel but intuitive: maintaining complex 
rules across hundreds or thousands of trials is cognitively effortful for humans, and would 
likely be more so for a rhesus macaque. Alternatively, Obi's multicue strategy use may 
have been consistent throughout, but the strategy analysis failed to identify it reliably. 
Analyses of simulated data (see Figure 4.1) discount this possibility somewhat, but a 
highly inconsistent adherence rate to a given strategy, for example, could spike the false 
identification rates much higher than those depicted in the figure. Finally, it is possible 
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that Obi consistently adopted the use of a strategy that was not specified in the strategy 
analysis. 
 
4.7 Strategy Analysis Summary 
Monkeys that reliably adopted cue-based strategies retained them within an 
experiment and often returned to them in each new experiment. Figure 4.7 presents a 
simplified Markov State diagram depicting the rates of strategy retention and switching 
among three groups of strategies: one group of side-biased blocks (R bias and S bias), one 
group of random blocks, and a third group of all blocks in which cue-based strategies were 
used. The state transitions depict rates of shifts from use of one of the strategy groups in 
a block to a different one of the strategy groups, as well as rates at which that strategy 
group was retained. Retention was very high overall, with the likeliest strategy for a block 
of responses by a monkey predicting the likeliest strategy for the next block a majority of 
the time for a majority of monkeys. Figure 4.8 depicts the proportion of blocks in which 
the highest likelihood strategy was the same across two blocks for each monkey, and 
overall.  
Monkeys that used cue-based strategies did not demonstrate strategy use at earlier 
blocks as experience with weather prediction tasks increased. Figures 4.9-10 depict the 
block at which a cue-based strategy was acquired (defined as the same strategy having the 
highest likelihood for a majority of five successive blocks) for each monkey and overall, 
respectively. No obvious relationship existed between cue-based strategy acquisition and 
experience in the task. This result, along with the strategy analyses depicted in Figures 
4.3-6, suggests no role of practice effects in the task and, instead, repeated measurement 
of identical series of behaviors to a series of mechanically identical tasks (with the 
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exceptions of Experiments 2d and 2e, which varied the probability table for the task yet 
still maintained the general results). 
 
4.8 Other Analyses 
Response latencies, both the time from trial onset to response and the total time in 
which the joystick was depressed, were also recorded for each trial. Although there were 
no specific hypotheses about response latencies, analyses of this additional measure 
might capture aspects of the monkeys’ performance in the task to which the strategy 
analysis was blind. For example, it may be the case that each strategy entails a certain 
amount of processing time, and that response time may be used as a behavioral marker 
of strategy use alongside rates of responding to the different cue patterns.  Differences in 
processing time would perhaps be evidenced in response latencies, and not captured by 
the strategy analysis alone (see Tables 4.3-6 for descriptive statistics of response 
latencies).  
Bayesian modeling was used to detect any differences in response latencies. 
Central tendency and scale parameters were estimated to describe the mean and standard 
deviation, respectively, of a latent distribution that modeled response latency. These 
parameters were estimated once for each of three groups of strategies. One central 
tendency and scale pair was estimated for trials in which the strategy analysis suggested 
R or S biased responding. A second pair was estimated for trials in which the strategy 
analysis suggested random responding. A third pair was estimated for trials in which the 
strategy analysis suggested cue-based responding. Because response latencies are heavily 
skewed (response latencies can extend to the end of the test session, but never be faster 
than around 1 second), two transformations of response latencies were made to facilitate 
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modeling (for strengths and weaknesses of this approach, see Grayson, 2004; Lo & 
Andrews, 2015). First, only response latencies faster than 7 sec were included in the 
analysis. This arbitrary cutoff removes the slowest 7% of trials, that likely represented 
monkey behaviors that are not of interest to the present investigation (e.g., drinking 
water, taking a nap, interactions with conspecifics, etc.), while preserving response 
latencies that could reasonably represent time taken to process the cue information and 
make a response. Second, response latencies were natural log transformed to remove 
remaining skew from the distribution and sharpen parameter estimates. The response 
latencies that capture time from trial onset to response were used, as processing time 
could plausibly include times in which the animal was not deflecting the joystick. 
Bayesian modeling techniques were used because they offer flexible matching of 
analysis to design, emphasize estimation of parameters of interest instead of binary 
decision criteria, facilitate identification of where differences demonstrably do not exist 
(akin to accepting the null hypothesis in frequentist significance testing), and cope well 
with unbalanced designs (Kruschke, 2018; Kruschke & Liddell, 2018a; McElreath, 2020). 
Although the central tendency and scale of response latency distributions would be 
expected to vary across individual monkeys as well, and thus could have been included in 
a Bayesian multilevel model, the severely unbalanced distribution of inferred strategy use 
prevented effective modeling of this potential predictor. Some monkeys only very rarely 
contributed response latencies due to cue-based strategy use, and the high retention rates 
described above made the individual monkeys highly correlated with their strategy of 
choice. Adding monkey identity to the model would only convolute measurement of the 
strategy group parameters of interest. Analyses were completed using the pandas and 
pymc3 packages of Python 3.7 (McKinney, 2011; Salvatier et al., 2016). Parameter 
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estimates were made using 20,000 Markov Chain Monte Carlo steps (10,000 tuning 
steps).  
Results of this response latency analysis, with distribution mean estimates 
transformed back to the original units (msec), are plotted in Figure 4.11. Trials from 
blocks in which side biases were inferred were demonstrably faster than trials from blocks 
in which random or cue-based strategies were inferred. Because processing of cues was 
likely very low for monkeys employing these side-biased strategies, akin to lever-pressing 
on a variable ratio reward schedule, this effect was to be expected. It is more interesting 
that no difference was observed between blocks in which random strategies were inferred 
and those in which cue-based strategies were inferred. If greater response latency 
suggests greater time processing the stimulus information, the equivalent response 
latencies of random strategy blocks and cue-based strategy blocks suggests sincere 
processing of cue information in random strategy blocks.  
This result may suggest use of a strategy that was not specified in the strategy 
analysis in these blocks. This failure of model specification and selection would be 
analogous to a Type II error – there is structure to the data, but the model is not sensitive 
enough to capture it and the analyst erroneously reports no effect. Many animals use win-
stay and lose-shift strategies in highly serialized tasks with binary response options (e.g., 
Levine, 1959). Figure 4.12 depicts the rate of win-stay/lose-shift strategy use by monkeys 
in blocks of random strategy use. As in Whitham and Washburn (2020), no evidence for 
use of this particular serial dependency in the monkeys’ responses was observed. Further 
descriptive analyses did not reveal any obvious cue dependency in the random blocks as 
might suggest specification of an additional, heretofore unidentified strategy. Taken 
together these analyses suggest that random strategy use reflected failed attempts to make 
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use of the available cue information, or otherwise misinformed guesses, rather than 
structured responding using an approach not included in the strategy analysis. 
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Table 4.1 Strategies 
 
 Description 
Random Each response is made randomly. 
 
R bias R responses are predicted to every cue combination. 
 
S bias S responses are predicted to every cue combination. 
 
Singleton Optimal responses are predicted when only one cue is onscreen. 
 
 
Random or side-biased responses are predicted when multiple cues are 
onscreen. 
 
Single-cue [cue] The presence or absence of one cue guides all responses - to the 
response predicted by that cue if that cue if it is present, or to the 
opposite response if it is not present. 
 
Singleton-Prototype Optimal responses are predicted when one cue is onscreen or two cues 
that predict the same response are onscreen. 
 
Random or side-biased responses are predicted when cues that predict 
opposite responses are onscreen. 
 
Two v One Optimal responses are predicted when one cue is onscreen, when two 
cues that predict the same response are onscreen, or when two cues that 
predict the same response and one cue that predicts the opposite 
response are onscreen. 
 
Random or side-biased responses are predicted when cues that predict 
opposite responses are onscreen and majority rule cannot guide 
responses. 
 
All but Two Strong 
Cues 
The optimal response is predicted for every cue combination except 
those in which both of the strongly predictive cues are onscreen 
together. 
 
Perfect The optimal response is predicted to every cue combination. 
 
  
67 
Table 4.2 Cue Patterns, Frequencies, and Strategies. Each row describes the set 
of responses a strategy predicts to the different cue patterns. A strategy predicted a 
deflection to the R response, the S response, or make no specific prediction (chance rates 
of responding among the two two responses, Rand). Cues can be strong (R or S) or weak 
(r or s) evidence that a response will be rewarded. The rate at which an animal will be 
assumed to adhere to a strategy is not 100%, to allow for anticipated deviations due to 
exploratory behavior, probability matching, and other factors. Each strategy predicted 
a unique set of R responses, S responses, and random responses to the 14 unique cue 
patterns. 
 
 Cue Patterns 
 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
 Cues Present 
 R r Rr s Rs rs Rrs S RS rS RrS Ss RSs rSs 
Strategies not based on cue 
information               
    Random Rand Rand Rand Rand Rand Rand Rand Rand Rand Rand Rand Rand Rand Rand 
    R bias R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 
    S bias S S S S S S S S S S S S S S 
Strategies based on a single cue               
    Strong Singleton R Rand Rand Rand Rand Rand Rand S Rand Rand Rand Rand Rand Rand 
        Strong Singleton w/ R bias R R R R R R R S R R R R R R 
        Strong Singleton w/ S bias R S S S S S S S S S S S S S 
    Singleton R R Rand S Rand Rand Rand S Rand Rand Rand Rand Rand Rand 
        Singleton w/ R bias R R R S R R R S R R R R R R 
        Singleton w/ S bias R R S S S S S S S S S S S S 
    Single-Cue Strong R R S R S R S R S R S R S R S 
    Single-Cue Weak R S R R S S R R S S R R S S R 
    Single-Cue Weak S R R R S S S S R R R R S S S 
    Single-Cue Strong S R R R R R R R S S S S S S S 
Strategies based on multiple cues               
    Singleton Prototype R R R S Rand Rand Rand S Rand Rand Rand S Rand Rand 
        Singleton Prototype w/ R bias R R R S R R R S R R R S R R 
        Singleton Prototype w/ S bias R R R S S S S S S S S S S S 
    Two v One R R R S Rand Rand R S Rand Rand R S S S 
        Two v One w/ R bias R R R S R R R S R R R S S S 
        Two v One w/ S bias R R R S S S R S S S R S S S 
    All but Two Strong Cards R R R S R Rand R S Rand S Rand S Rand S 
        All but Two Strong Cards w/ R bias R R R S R R R S R S R S R S 
        All but Two Strong Cards w/ S bias R R R S R S R S S S S S S S 
    Perfect R R R S R Rand R S Rand S R S S S 
        Perfect w/ R bias R R R S R R R S R S R S S S 
        Perfect w/ S bias R R R S R S R S S S R S S S 
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Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics for Experiment 1 
 
 Experiment 1a Experiment 1b Experiment 1c Experiment 1d Experiment 1e 
 p(Optimal) Latency p(Optimal) Latency p(Optimal) Latency p(Optimal) Latency p(Optimal) Latency 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Albert 0.50 0.06 1924 291 0.51 0.07 1847 270 0.51 0.09 1818 255 0.62 0.12 1857 228 0.65 0.11 1735 213 
Applesauce 0.50 0.07 2253 396 0.50 0.07 2357 327 0.50 0.08 2212 258 0.50 0.07 2294 220 0.50 0.08 2346 504 
Bailey 0.51 0.09 2357 281 0.64 0.16 2194 236 0.50 0.08 1688 613 0.50 0.07 1374 419 0.52 0.09 2026 230 
Benny 0.50 0.08 1301 255 0.50 0.08 1175 177 0.50 0.06 1211 158 0.50 0.07 1166 157 0.50 0.09 1075 87 
Chewie 0.50 0.08 1108 150 0.50 0.06 1134 151 0.50 0.08 1185 110 0.49 0.08 1147 119 0.50 0.07 1136 195 
Gabe 0.50 0.06 2160 252 0.50 0.07 2273 187 0.50 0.08 2089 217 0.50 0.09 2158 189 0.50 0.07 2065 178 
Gambit 0.55 0.08 3665 316 0.56 0.09 3531 366 0.52 0.09 3386 294 0.76 0.16 2983 234 0.79 0.17 3424 280 
Gonzo 0.53 0.08 2436 302 0.60 0.15 2513 249 0.58 0.12 2515 201 0.82 0.14 2509 269 0.60 0.23 2449 272 
Gretel 0.54 0.08 2543 279 0.69 0.17 2738 325 0.49 0.08 2633 274 0.63 0.09 2523 256 0.78 0.12 2265 231 
Griffin 0.51 0.09 2526 259 0.64 0.12 2243 253 0.76 0.16 2357 216 0.75 0.15 2150 283 0.66 0.15 2090 346 
Han 0.52 0.09 2094 402 0.49 0.08 2168 200 0.49 0.05 2232 265 0.49 0.07 1892 273 0.50 0.09 1631 288 
Hank 0.50 0.08 3222 267 0.50 0.07 2959 401 0.50 0.05 2799 228 0.50 0.07 2790 176 0.50 0.06 3015 330 
Ingrid 0.55 0.09 2531 311 0.77 0.16 2458 366 0.77 0.15 2351 216 0.75 0.19 2408 240 0.79 0.17 2312 264 
Ira 0.51 0.06 2609 438 0.50 0.07 2073 281 0.57 0.13 2083 258 0.80 0.12 2261 229 0.60 0.1 2252 206 
Irene 0.50 0.08 2875 307 0.50 0.05 2305 175 0.48 0.08 2540 219 0.54 0.11 2720 353 0.61 0.13 2775 225 
Ivory 0.50 0.10 2610 327 0.50 0.08 2285 211 0.50 0.07 2141 198 0.53 0.09 2061 328 0.51 0.1 2166 329 
Liam 0.57 0.07 2818 291 0.52 0.07 2325 265 0.55 0.07 2261 371 0.50 0.06 1883 224 0.47 0.08 2316 474 
Lily 0.49 0.07 2441 186 0.61 0.16 2176 213 0.59 0.13 2077 208 0.78 0.13 2257 252 0.60 0.12 2085 211 
Logan 0.51 0.09 2355 214 0.52 0.08 2517 241 0.49 0.1 2412 326 0.51 0.06 2555 211 0.58 0.1 2388 215 
Lou 0.48 0.07 2211 287 0.51 0.07 2263 286 0.54 0.06 2713 248 0.53 0.08 2368 265 0.49 0.07 2119 251 
Luke 0.50 0.05 1813 307 0.50 0.06 1805 238 0.50 0.08 1602 241 0.50 0.08 1297 179 0.50 0.08 1450 280 
Lychee 0.48 0.09 2698 290 0.48 0.08 2237 214 0.52 0.07 2257 305 0.50 0.08 2277 240 0.49 0.11 2004 219 
Mason 0.51 0.09 2758 411 0.50 0.07 2681 169 0.52 0.09 2583 194 0.48 0.07 2590 131 0.53 0.08 2809 297 
Murph 0.51 0.07 1475 235 0.50 0.08 1636 150 0.49 0.08 1646 135 0.51 0.08 1867 308 0.50 0.08 1510 180 
Nkima 0.53 0.08 2425 417 0.50 0.09 1634 423 0.50 0.07 1362 242 0.48 0.1 2626 218 0.48 0.06 2583 255 
Obi 0.53 0.08 2105 326 0.51 0.06 1945 176 0.51 0.08 1809 224 0.49 0.09 2055 317 0.50 0.07 1412 214 
Paddy 0.48 0.07 2879 209 0.52 0.08 2985 376 0.58 0.08 2802 448 0.70 0.13 2569 467 0.50 0.08 1070 40 
Widget 0.50 0.09 2047 119 0.50 0.06 1813 232 0.66 0.17 1750 218 0.73 0.13 1779 128 0.80 0.11 1871 213 
Wren 0.52 0.06 2280 310 0.57 0.09 2146 236 0.52 0.11 2024 178 0.71 0.13 2084 147 0.69 0.10 2261 223 
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Table 4.4 Descriptive statistics for Experiment 2 
 
 Experiment 2a Experiment 2b Experiment 2c Experiment 2d Experiment 2e 
 p(Optimal) Latency p(Optimal) Latency p(Optimal) Latency p(Optimal) Latency p(Optimal) Latency 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Albert 0.75 0.15 2307 601 0.63 0.12 2353 265 0.69 0.19 2285 793 0.6 0.14 2704 310 0.68 0.15 2533 428 
Applesauce 0.51 0.07 2258 298 0.50 0.08 2317 261 0.56 0.14 2511 348 0.53 0.10 2999 312 0.50 0.08 2354 242 
Bailey 0.51 0.07 1644 314 0.51 0.07 1956 281 0.49 0.09 1835 210 0.49 0.09 1973 217 0.49 0.09 2282 363 
Chewie 0.50 0.06 1145 97 0.50 0.07 1158 87 0.50 0.08 1088 79 0.51 0.09 1135 98 0.50 0.07 1145 162 
Gabe 0.51 0.08 1474 239 0.50 0.06 1689 263 0.50 0.07 1919 258 0.50 0.07 2289 233 0.50 0.07 2261 210 
Griffin 0.62 0.11 2251 502 0.55 0.11 2732 337 0.57 0.11 2912 284 0.63 0.12 2718 271 0.76 0.15 2473 236 
Han 0.51 0.08 2110 349 0.52 0.08 2007 629 0.50 0.06 1043 0 0.50 0.07 1043 0 0.50 0.07 1043 0 
Hank 0.50 0.07 2388 250 0.50 0.07 2160 312 0.48 0.07 2602 435 0.50 0.07 3058 274 0.49 0.07 2998 352 
Ingrid 0.77 0.16 2955 445 0.61 0.09 2889 433 0.47 0.08 3021 231 0.64 0.22 2319 214 0.86 0.10 2586 211 
Irene 0.56 0.10 2302 316 0.54 0.10 2281 174 0.64 0.12 2535 390 0.50 0.09 2840 331 0.51 0.08 2301 339 
Ivory 0.50 0.09 1982 243 0.54 0.10 2233 313 0.50 0.07 2008 225 0.50 0.10 2189 381 0.50 0.06 1892 301 
Liam 0.53 0.08 1756 288 0.50 0.08 1471 235 0.51 0.06 1491 230 0.50 0.08 1415 324 0.50 0.09 1181 119 
Lily 0.49 0.08 2164 279 0.50 0.07 2428 626 0.48 0.07 2538 432 0.50 0.08 1999 238 0.50 0.08 2252 316 
Lou 0.48 0.09 2245 230 0.49 0.07 2069 212 0.56 0.09 2468 228 0.50 0.07 2073 263 0.49 0.07 2167 301 
Luke 0.50 0.07 1796 299 0.50 0.07 1711 202 0.50 0.08 1418 291 0.50 0.08 2002 280 0.50 0.08 1575 195 
Murph 0.52 0.09 1609 171 0.58 0.07 2101 359 0.52 0.09 1903 219 0.49 0.08 1685 281 0.52 0.09 1307 145 
Obi 0.54 0.08 2521 448 0.58 0.08 2545 370 0.55 0.08 2424 287 0.52 0.07 1761 172 0.50 0.07 1780 249 
Wren 0.56 0.09 2272 278 0.53 0.09 2427 784 0.42 0.10 2636 356 0.50 0.08 2524 268 0.55 0.07 2184 222 
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Table 4.5 Descriptive statistics for Experiment 3 
 
 Experiment 3a Experiment 3b Experiment 3c Experiment 3d 
 p(Optimal) Latency p(Optimal) Latency p(Optimal) Latency p(Optimal) Latency 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Albert 0.69 0.14 2379 316 0.55 0.07 2668 467 0.65 0.11 2683 484 0.60 0.13 2157 451 
Applesauce 0.51 0.06 2416 369 0.49 0.07 2540 408 0.50 0.09 2652 378 0.51 0.09 2272 290 
Bailey 0.50 0.08 2188 268 0.51 0.07 2030 168 0.49 0.07 1842 272 0.49 0.10 1778 255 
Chewie 0.50 0.09 1142 149 0.50 0.08 1225 253 0.50 0.10 1079 80 0.50 0.08 1031 13 
Gabe 0.50 0.05 2177 296 0.50 0.06 2155 230 0.49 0.08 2141 246 0.50 0.09 2313 432 
Griffin 0.82 0.11 2132 146 0.53 0.08 2409 323 0.56 0.12 2413 335 0.70 0.17 2104 188 
Han 0.50 0.07 1042 1 0.50 0.08 1042 0 0.50 0.07 1043 0 0.51 0.09 1769 402 
Hank 0.51 0.05 3061 234 0.50 0.09 2924 240 0.50 0.08 2903 244 0.50 0.07 3058 316 
Ingrid 0.73 0.14 2502 177 0.52 0.09 2486 186 0.49 0.07 2653 228 0.47 0.08 2466 291 
Irene 0.49 0.07 2341 181 0.50 0.07 2505 302 0.60 0.07 2403 308 0.57 0.06 2529 331 
Liam 0.51 0.07 1933 522 0.51 0.06 1992 238 0.51 0.09 1747 130 0.50 0.10 1715 187 
Lily 0.50 0.08 2201 180 0.50 0.07 2385 530 0.50 0.09 2037 171 0.50 0.06 2150 364 
Lou 0.51 0.07 2119 321 0.50 0.06 1992 219 0.48 0.08 1902 247 0.51 0.08 2130 191 
Luke 0.50 0.07 1498 146 0.50 0.06 1711 271 0.50 0.08 1678 207 0.50 0.08 1611 184 
Murph 0.50 0.08 1242 94 0.51 0.09 1551 216 0.53 0.08 1282 136 0.52 0.08 1621 154 
Obi 0.71 0.13 2103 292 0.52 0.09 2116 252 0.55 0.09 1519 327 0.60 0.13 1578 177 
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Table 4.6 Descriptive statistics for Experiment 4 
 
 Experiment 4a Experiment 4b Experiment 4c Experiment 4d 
 p(Optimal) Latency p(Optimal) Latency p(Optimal) Latency p(Optimal) Latency 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Applesauce 0.60 0.10 1988 289 0.51 0.07 2434 334 0.50 0.08 2610 525 0.77 0.08 2263 294 
Chewie 0.50 0.08 1087 73 0.50 0.06 1055 30 0.50 0.07 1232 200 0.50 0.07 1257 212 
Han 0.52 0.08 2257 207 0.54 0.08 2283 233 0.52 0.09 1388 402 0.51 0.08 1820 688 
Hank 0.51 0.07 2865 207 0.51 0.09 2414 254 0.50 0.06 2235 171 0.50 0.09 2458 334 
Ingrid 0.46 0.10 2499 204 0.48 0.06 2723 157 0.47 0.10 3039 415 0.53 0.11 3177 417 
Irene missing data 0.57 0.09 1967 195 0.53 0.12 2291 244 0.68 0.20 2394 242 
Liam 0.57 0.12 2203 660 0.61 0.10 2457 382 0.68 0.11 2381 237 0.76 0.11 2390 296 
Lily missing data 0.50 0.08 1832 212 0.52 0.07 2080 404 0.50 0.07 2315 570 
Lou 0.51 0.09 2280 271 0.46 0.08 2172 239 0.51 0.08 2237 246 0.78 0.15 2261 183 
Luke 0.50 0.07 2111 445 0.50 0.09 1572 245 0.50 0.09 1956 476 0.50 0.07 1767 397 
Murph 0.60 0.14 1515 372 0.64 0.11 1972 390 0.74 0.11 2199 284 0.83 0.07 2227 231 
Obi 0.71 0.10 2114 311 0.73 0.09 1880 200 0.74 0.15 2176 305 0.76 0.11 2141 303 
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Figure 4.1 Simulated strategy recovery. The strategy used to simulate response 
data is printed in the top-right corner of each plot. ‘Exact’ recoveries are the rate at 
which the strategy analysis recovered the exact strategy that was used to simulate 
response data. ‘Strategy’ recoveries are the rate at which the strategy analysis identified 
the correct strategy except for misidentifying the presence or absence of any S or R 
biases. Both of these types of recoveries are accurate. In ‘Other’ recoveries the strategy 
that was used to generate the data was misidentified. Figure adapted from Whitham & 
Washburn (2020). 
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Figure 4.2. Response optimality. The y-axis of each plot depicts the proportion 
of trials in which the optimal response was used in each experiment by each monkey.
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Figure 4.3  Strategy use in Experiment 1. The many possible strategies of the strategy analysis are grouped into 
four bins for plotting on the y-axis: no cue use (random or side-biased strategies), use of one cue (single-cue or singleton 
strategies), use of multiple cues (singleton-prototype, two vs one), or [nearly] perfect strategies (all but two strong cards 
and perfect strategies). The eight capuchin monkeys on the left side of the plot used cues in their responding substantially 
more than the other animals, and the strategies they used are annotated within each experiment accordingly. Note that 
these bins are only for visualization purposes, and were not incorporated into the modeling. 
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Figure 4.4 Strategy use in Experiment 2. The many possible strategies of the strategy analysis are grouped in the 
same way as in Figure 4.3. The three capuchin monkeys on the left side of the figure used cues in their responding 
substantially more than the other animals, and the strategies they used are annotated within each experiment 
accordingly. 
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Figure 4.5 Strategy use in Experiment 3. The many possible strategies of the strategy analysis are grouped in the 
same way as Figure 4.3. The four monkeys on the left side of the figure used cues in their responding substantially more 
than the other animals, and the strategies they used are annotated within each experiment accordingly. 
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Figure 4.6 Strategy use in Experiment 4. The many possible strategies of the strategy analysis are grouped in the 
same way as Figure 4.3. The five monkeys on the left side of the figure used cues in their responding substantially more 
than the other animals, and the strategies they used are annotated within each experiment accordingly. 
 
 
 
78 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Simplified Markov state diagram. Arrows denote block-over-block 
rates of switching and retention among R or S biased strategies, the random strategy, 
and cue-based strategies. 
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Figure 4.8 Strategy retention rates by individual monkeys and overall. 
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Figure 4.9 Strategy acquisition by experiment for each monkey. Black diamonds denote the block at which a 
majority of the highest likelihood strategies for the previous 5 blocks were the same, cue-based strategy. Experiments are 
depicted along the x-axis, with each tick one of the 1000 trial experiments (e.g., Experiment 1a, Experiment 1b, etc.). No 
obvious relationship exists between experiments and strategy acquisition. Monkeys did not use strategies earlier in 
experiments as they acquired more experience with the task. 
 
  
81 
 
Figure 4.10 Strategy acquisition by Experiment for all monkey. Black diamonds denote the block at which a 
majority of the highest likelihood strategies for the previous 5 blocks were the same, cue-based strategy for a monkey, in 
an experiment. These data are the same as in Figure 4.9, and many monkeys contributed multiple points to this plot by 
demonstrating strategy acquisition multiple times across the many experiments. Experiments are depicted along the x-
axis, with each tick one of the 1000-block experiments. No obvious relationship exists among the points, such that animals 
did not acquire strategies more quickly across repeated exposures to the various weather predictions tasks. 
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Figure 4.11 Central tendency of response latency distributions. Blocks were clustered as the product of side-biased, 
random, or cue-based strategies. The black diamond denotes the mean central tendency. Transparent grey diamonds are 
average monkey response latencies in a block inferred to be the product of the strategy group on the x-axis, included only 
as a reference to the distribution of the raw data. Random jitter along the x-axis was added to the grey diamonds to make 
a greater portion of the mean response latencies from blocked trials visible. 
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Figure 4.12 Win-stay or lose-shift strategy use. The height of each bar is the proportion of trials by each monkey in 
which a response in accordance with a win-stay or lose-shift strategy was observed in blocks of random strategy use. The 
dashed line indicates chance use of a win-stay or lose-shift strategy. 
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5 Discussion 
This dissertation was conceived of as an attempt to identify the cognitive, 
perceptual, and motivational determinants of monkey behavior in a probabilistic 
categorization task. The unique challenges to learning posed by both probabilistic and 
categorization tasks made the effective sample size (i.e., the number of unique individuals 
that contributed informationally rich data) of this series of experiments lower than 
anticipated across all experiments. Despite the sample size, conclusions from this series 
of studies are clear. Evidence for each of the potential determinants of the monkeys’ 
behavior will be evaluated and discussed in turn. 
 
5.1 Cognitive Determinants 
Hypothesis I: Strategy use during probabilistic categorization is a stable trait of an 
individual animal, and the same strategies used by an animal in one weather prediction 
task will be those used in another task. 
 
 Strategy use in probabilistic categorization tasks by individual monkeys was highly 
stable across blocks and experiments. Of critical concern to Hypothesis I, monkey strategy 
use did not at all resemble a series of random draws from the bank of specified strategies, 
or from any subset thereof with a length of more than one or two. Moreover, this was true 
to a similar extent for each monkey that demonstrated cue-based strategy use. No 
monkey, with the possible exception of Obi (rhesus) in Experiment 4, sampled widely 
among the available strategies within or across experiments. Hypothesis I was overall 
well-supported.  
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 However, contra Hypothesis I, monkeys did not evidence the rich interindividual 
variability in clustered individual differences that would suggest that use of “trait” would 
be appropriate. Instead, the various plausible determinants of nonhuman primate 
strategy use (e.g., selective attention, associative learning ability) seemingly do little to 
avert species-wide convergence to the same few, highly similar strategies. These results 
predict that the same strategies used by a species in one weather prediction task are 
strongly predictive of strategy use by that species in every weather prediction task. 
  
Hypothesis II: Behavior in weather prediction tasks is guided by factors other than an 
individual's preferred strategy, and titration of overall reward rate in the task will 
titrate strategy use accordingly. Specifically, the animals that used Random or Side-
Bias strategies in Experiment 1 will use cue information to guide responding in 
Experiments 2a, 2b, and 2c. 
 
 In accordance with Hypothesis II, strategy use was sensitive to experimental 
manipulations to reward rate. However, the sensitivity was only demonstrated to affect 
adoption of a Single-Cue strategy. When many animals that had not previously 
demonstrated cue-based strategy use began using cue-based strategies at the most 
extreme reward rates tested, in Experiment 4, they were observed only to adopt those 
strategies that other individuals were already using. These manipulations had no 
demonstrable effect on the observed distribution of cue-based strategies, the complexity 
of strategy use, or the speed of strategy adoption.  
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Hypothesis III: Behavior in weather prediction tasks is guided by factors other than an 
individual's preferred strategy, and a set of more egalitarian cue probabilities will beget 
greater multicue responding in the animals that readily use strategies. Animals that do 
not readily use strategies will revert to Random or Side-biased strategies. 
 
 Hypothesis III was not supported. Experiments 2d and 2e presented animals with 
a set of probabilistic relationships among cues, responses, and outcomes in which the 
most highly predictive cues were less predictive than in other experiments, and the least 
predictive cues were more predictive than in other experiments. This manipulation did 
not cause more diverse, complex, or rapid strategy use. 
 Trends in the individual animals’ strategy use seem to suggest that individual 
differences in learning rate could bear strongly on the observed rates of strategy adoption 
by the animals. Although the different animals largely arrived at use of the same strategy 
if they were going to use cues, how many trials were required before they used the cues 
reliably seemed to vary across individuals. Here, learning rate is used in the most rote 
associative and parametric of senses. Because such a learning rate is exclusively based on 
observation of behavior, it could be alternatively conceptualized not as reflecting the rate 
of internalization of cue information but instead as the rate of utilization of what 
information was learned (Speekenbrink et al., 2008). The source of any differences in 
learning rate could reasonably originate with differences in leveraging of attention, 
memory for what the animal did in previous trials, or any number of other, equivalently 
plausible cognitive constructs.  
 Consider the strategy analysis results from Experiment 2 for Ingrid (capuchin), 
Albert (capuchin), and Chewie (rhesus) (Figure 4.4). Ingrid reliably used Single-Cue 
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strategies in Experiment 2a and 2e from a very early block through the end of that 
experiment. Albert adopted use of the same Single-Cue strategy more fitfully, and nearer 
to the end of Experiments 2a, 2c, and 2d. Chewie did not evidence use of any strategy, but 
did reliably use Single-Cue strategies at higher block numbers in Whitham and Washburn 
(2020). Each of these observations fits neatly within an account of strategy use as 
dependent on a more global learning rate parameter. In such a conception, Ingrid learned 
one cue’s predictive validity rapidly and utilized it into Single-Cue responding for the 
remainder of the experiment. Instantiation of such a parameter may also explain Ingrid’s 
absent/decremented strategy use in other experiments, if what was internalized at an 
early trial was that no cue has predictive validity to either response. If Albert’s 
hypothetical learning rate parameter was lower, cue information would be learned more 
slowly, and cue-based strategy use would be evident only late in experiments. If Chewie’s 
learning rate was lower still, 1,000 trials of cue exposure could be insufficient for any 
demonstration of cue-based strategy use to emerge.  
 The apparent ceiling on the complexity of strategy use in probabilistic 
categorization may be underpinned by cognitive and associative mechanisms with a much 
longer history of experimental study. Conditioned blocking designs describe the 
remarkable degree to which cue information that does not contribute uniquely to a known 
cue/response relationship will not be acquired despite extensive opportunity for learning 
(Kamin, 1968; Kruschke, 2003). In such a design a participant first learns that cue A is 
strongly predictive of response 1 being rewarded, then is repeatedly exposed to cue A and 
cue B simultaneously, with response 1 still rewarded. Even though the participant 
experiences that cue B is also perfectly predictive of response 1 being rewarded, probe 
88 
trials with cue B reveal that participants do not behave as if cue B is perfectly predictive 
in this way.   
 A conception of probabilistic categorization in which utilization of single cues acts 
as a prerequisite for use of multiple cues, or even that learning of single cues is simply 
more likely than use of multiple cues, may inadvertently transform any weather 
prediction task into an approximation of a conditioned blocking design. In such a 
conception, learning of the first cue precludes learning of additional cues, even though 
the additional cues may be just as valid (and certainly contribute unique information 
relevant to optimal performance on the task). This synergy between observed strategy use 
and conditioned blocking designs is not perfect. Conditioned blocking designs typically 
require that the first cue learned is perfectly (or very highly) predictive of the response, 
and by definition no weather prediction task has this feature. That the first cue is not 
perfect, and thus does not perfectly block learning of other cues, may be what allows many 
humans to develop multicue responding. Across training, human participants may come 
to learn that the single cue-response relationship that they have learned is imperfect and 
“unblock” attention to other cues. However, animal learning is not prevented by initial 
learning in many other tasks in which animals spontaneously evidence new or superior 
cognition as performance matures. Moreover, in the best evidence for multicue strategy 
use among these experiments (Obi’s Experiment 4), use of multiple cues was not preceded 
by use of less complex strategies. If, when animals do use multicue strategies, they do so 
right away, the initial conditioning phase of the blocking design would not occur. 
Although these notes prevent conditioned blocking from entirely explaining the observed 
pattern of results, any conditioned gating of attention to other cues may have contributed 
to the overall lack of use of multiple cues by the monkeys. 
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 Information theory, more broadly, can present the problem of probabilistic 
categorization in similarly clarifying terms. The information yielded by a highly predictive 
cue was very high – offering an animal reward rates that were nearly at ceiling in most 
experiments from what would otherwise be the floor of chance responding. But once a 
valid cue was learned and utilized, learning a second, equally highly predictive cue offered 
the animal very little new information relevant to its decision-making. Although the 
superior reward rates yielded by the breadth of multicue strategies and the many patterns 
in which cue information might have appeared ensured that the informational and reward 
value of multicue learning was never literally absent, it may have been functionally so in 
many or all experiments.  
 It is also true that while experimenter and reviewer have omniscient insight into 
the structure of the task and the minor superiority of multicue strategy use, the monkeys 
likely lacked any such insight. To highly experimentally savvy animals, a task in which 
rewards are being dispensed at above-chance levels is solved. Moreover, successfully 
ignoring cue information that is not part of the selected, above-chance solution is a skill 
in many tasks that may feature irrelevant or incongruous cue information. Note that these 
considerations from information theory are important only to accounts in which strategic 
use of multiple cues develops incrementally from strategic use of single cues. Although 
this progression is what has been previously demonstrated in weather prediction tasks 
with humans, and was hypothesized in this study, it is not any exclusive way in which 
multiple items of cue information may be utilized. Presentation of weather prediction 
tasks to other species, or of weather prediction cues to primates in other experimental or 
naturalistic contexts, may reveal other routes through which strategic use of multiple cues 
develops. 
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  The discrepancy between the cues with the highest predictive validity and the cues 
with lower predictive validity was intended, and is part of the challenge of situations in 
which multiple sources of information can be productively synthesized. To return briefly 
to examples presented in Chapter I, the metrics that might commonly be highly predictive 
of student success or scholarly quality are imperfect. Some students with high 
standardized test scores will fall short of predicted achievement, and some impressive 
citation metrics do not reflect incredible contributions to science. Other metrics might 
have predicted these discrepancies. Nuance in evaluating the relative validity of multiple 
competing sources of information, and facilitating use of multiple sources of information 
most effectively when a single source would seemingly suffice, is a very desirable set of 
human behaviors. The present results do little to provide direct recommendations for 
producing this desirable type of learning and responding. To the extent that the observed 
strategy use of the capuchin monkeys and rhesus macaques might model that of humans 
in these novel manipulations to the task, none of primary reinforcement manipulation, 
cue manipulation, practice effects, or naturally occurring individual differences in 
attention, memory, or other relevant cognitive competencies are seemingly fruitful 
predictors of multicue strategy use. A set of experiments with human participants that 
manipulated weather prediction tasks in the same ways as this dissertation would bear 
much more strongly on this more applied dimension of the study of probabilistic 
categorization. 
 Any direct mapping between the performance of monkeys and humans on the task 
should be made with extreme caution. Humans have evidenced markedly different, and 
markedly more multicue, strategy use than did the monkeys of this series of experiments. 
As reviewed in Chapter 1, some humans come to evidence some use of multicue strategies 
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in as few as 200 total trials. Differences in the framing of the task may explain part of this 
distinction, as in many probability evaluation tasks (Nickerson, 2004). Those tasks that 
frame the cues as symptoms and the responses as fictional diagnoses, or the cues as 
human features and the responses as preferred ice cream flavors, would seem to make 
clear to human participants in very explicit, very linguistically-embedded way that each 
cue offers something unique to prediction of the response. This distinction aside, this 
series of experiments gave the animals dozens of opportunities, and unique incentives, to 
do what humans do in mechanically identical tasks relatively spontaneously, yet the 
animals never did so. This result, alongside the demonstration by Newell and colleagues 
(2011) of the primary role of explicit cognition in probabilistic categorization and related 
comparative data reviewed by Hampton and colleagues (2020), suggests much more 
strongly that differences in ability to leverage explicit cognition drives the observed 
species differences in probabilistic categorization. Animals do learn to use multiple 
informative cues to guide their responses, as robust literatures on contextual cuing and 
cognitive control demonstrate exhaustively (e.g., Smith & Beran, 2018). It is in the 
domain of this dissertation, the rare (in published cognition literature) or common (in 
human and monkey ecology) situation in which cues conflict and underspecify the 
outcome, that such a demonstration remains elusive. 
 If these results reflect a fundamentally cognitive difference between humans and 
monkeys, the specific nature of that difference likely reflects a unique, qualitative 
difference in learning (Rumbaugh, 1971). Comparative cognition is the study of many 
such differences, qualitative and quantitative alike, yet so severe a distinction among 
these species in a task with seemingly little language engagement is more unusual. A 
design in which human participants completed a standard weather prediction task under 
92 
conditions of articulatory suppression (e.g., verbally repeating "1, 2, 3, 4, a, b, c, d") might 
reveal some latent language engagement in the task. That the task not only engages 
explicit learning faculties more than it does implicit learning faculties, but also goes 
further still to engage high-level use of language, would be an unreported dimension to 
the task. This would add additional color to previously reported relationships between 
language impairments and probabilistic categorization. Those reports were motivated by 
the ostensible mediation of both language impairment and the weather prediction task by 
implicit, procedural processes, but may instead reflect the direct influence of language on 
weather prediction performance. 
  These data and analyses facilitate only speculation about the source of individual 
differences in strategy adoption across monkeys. No obvious effects of animal age or sex 
were observed, but formal analyses of any effect of these parameters are precluded by the 
small sample sizes.  The visualizations of the strategy analysis outputs (Figures 4.3-6) 
suggest a clear difference between the strategy use of capuchins and rhesus macaques in 
these experiments. That the capuchin monkeys were demonstrably superior in leveraging 
cognition of probable explicit nature is noteworthy, given that the species is often less 
adept with other tasks described in such terms (e.g., Smith et al., 2009, Smith et al., 2018). 
This superiority is largely relative, however; the capuchin monkeys did not evidence any 
rule-based cognition that they have not previously demonstrated in discrete 
categorization tasks (e.g., Smith et al., 2012) or the probabilistic categorization task of 
Whitham and Washburn (2020). Instead, it was the rhesus macaques that sharply 
diverged from species norms on categorization and decision-making tasks of this kind. 
Absent other behavioral evidence from the rhesus macaques, unanticipated tumult in 
their housing, uncharacteristically low-quality responses to this and other concurrent 
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computerized cognitive-behavioral tasks, and other unaccounted motivational factors 
(described below) likely drove the apparent species difference to a much greater degree 
than any purely cognitive factor. 
 
5.2 Perceptual Determinants 
Hypothesis IV: Utilization of cues is, in part, a perceptual process, and design 
considerations that have been demonstrated to engender multicue perception will 
engender multicue strategy use. 
 
 The data from Griffin (capuchin), Ingrid (capuchin), and Obi (rhesus) in 
Experiment 3a support Hypothesis IV. Presentation of all cue information as one, 
spatially-contiguous percept seemed to engender cue-based responding on the basis of 
more than one cue among a subset of animals that were already using single-cue strategies 
effectively. Further methodological considerations could do much to shrink the gulf 
between the strategy use of monkeys in this series of tasks and what is reported of 
humans. Multiple discrete cues (i.e., individual clipart images) were exclusively used in 
these and other weather prediction tasks purposefully. Multiple separable, and 
potentially opposing, cues must be synthesized in the ecologically relevant problems that 
the task purports to model. In the canonical example, of predicting rainy weather, one 
uses the discrete and separable cues of overhead cloud cover, the recent weather report, 
and whether passersby have raincoats to estimate whether rain is likely. Despite this deep 
embedding of use of discrete cues in the probabilistic categorization literature, it is 
possible that this format is simply incongruous with how monkey perception receives cue 
information. A weather prediction task in which the four cues were configured as 
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dimensional properties of a single stimulus might more faithfully detect their 
probabilistic categorization abilities without any corrupting influence of local precedence. 
For example, a single cue that varies in shape (e.g., rectangle vs trapezoid), orientation 
(e.g., upright vs horizontal), x-axis position onscreen (e.g., left vs right side of screen), and 
y-axis position onscreen (e.g., upper vs lower portion of screen) could represent each of 
the cue configurations of conventional weather prediction tasks. Such an arrangement is 
not without precedent in study of probabilistic categorization (e.g., Kruschke & Johansen, 
1999), and may be uniquely well-suited for comparative study of monkeys’ cognition. 
 It is possible that monkeys’ predisposition to process perceptual information more 
locally did not cause the observed pattern of results in Experiment 3a. With only 13 total 
cue patterns, and therefore 13 unique percepts, the strategies used by these animals may 
be equally well-described as an “explicit memorization of unique category memberships” 
strategy. Animals are known to excel at learning how to map far greater numbers of 
unique stimuli to category memberships in ways that are not necessarily subject to the 
algorithmic cue weighting that probabilistic categorization ostensibly demands (e.g., 
Herrnstein et al., 1976). A requisite limitation of the manipulations of Experiment 3 was 
the lack of any mechanism with which to validate that the manipulation had functioned 
as intended. That is, although available literature suggested that attempting to subvert 
global/local biases or increase stimulus salience were worthwhile manipulations given the 
species and cognitions under study, no data from this study can estimate either the 
magnitude of global/local biases or the degree to which they were subverted (or whether 
order effects not captured by Experiment 1 went on to contribute to the observed strategy 
elaboration in Experiment 3a). Instead, these data provide compelling evidence that 
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further explorations of the role of primate perceptual norms will be important to any 
further exploration of probabilistic categorization. 
  
Hypothesis V: Utilization of cues is, in part, a perceptual process, and cues that are 
qualitatively different than those of other experiments (socially-interesting rather than 
asocial; discrete rather than abstract; inherently salient rather than sterilely 
controlled) should engender qualitatively different strategy use. 
 
 Hypothesis V was not supported. Manipulation of neither the orientation nor the 
identity of the cue information caused strategy use to become more frequent or more 
complex. In contrast, those animals that completed previous experiments strategically 
often failed to do so in the same way in Experiment 3. Those animals that did not use cue-
based strategies in previous experiments were not prompted to do so by the ostensibly 
perceptual manipulations of Experiment 3. The salience manipulations of Experiment 3c 
and 3d were perhaps particularly fraught. Sourcing images from public databases for use 
on spectrographically uncalibrated computer monitors ensured that the color and 
luminance of the images were only inconsistently faithful to the color and luminance 
information in the scene being depicted, and highly unfaithful to the species under study 
(Stevens et al., 2009). The highly artificial nature of those images likely made them much 
more akin to the clipart images of the other experiments than was originally intended 
(although see Talbot et al., 2016, for a demonstration of capuchin monkeys’ ability to 
recognize and adaptively to use similarly formatted images). Any corrupting influence of 
these perceptual considerations was likely minor, but one of many contributors to lower 
than expected data quality. If feasible, any future exploration into this manipulation 
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should maximize the fidelity to real color and luminance of any digital images that are 
expected to function via their fidelity to real color and luminance. 
 The near-exclusive use of single cues among monkeys that used cue-based 
strategies is not without precedent in other perceptual tasks. In comparative perception, 
the same predisposition of monkeys to perceive local stimulus features rather than more 
global properties that motivated the manipulations of Experiments 3a and 3b can be 
readily conceptualized as a more modular form of Single-cue strategy use. The  
experimental evidence that was used to justify Experiment 3b, specifically, in which faces 
are sometimes found to be a class of stimuli that are processed more globally and 
holistically than other manner of stimuli, are party to their own flavor of nonhuman 
primates’ single-cue superiority. In human gaze perception research, participants use 
both the head orientation and ratio of iris to visible sclera to make gaze judgments 
(Emery, 2000). In limited testing nonhuman primates have not been demonstrated to do 
so, and instead seem to ignore head direction in favor of the single cue of iris/sclera 
(Tomonaga & Imura, 2010).  
 
5.3 Motivational Determinants 
Of least theoretical interest to the study of probabilistic categorization were 
motivational determinants. In few situations would we expect complex cognition to 
increase as motivation decreases. Moreover, motivation may have been directly 
dependent on strategy use in the task: some of the animals that in Experiment 1 appeared 
most primed to demonstrate variable or complex strategy use in later experiments nearly 
universally failed to complete all later experiments.  
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Lower, but still high, levels of responding on the basis of no cue information were 
reported in the mechanically identical task of Whitham and Washburn (2020). Many 
animals in each study, including some animals that participated in both projects, 
seemingly evaluated the rate of pellet reward of side-biased or random responding as 
worthwhile. The manipulations to reward rate that were already included in the planned 
series of tasks reduced the rate of this behavior only inconsistently. Unfortunately, 
correction trials after incorrect responses could not be incorporated into the design (as 
recommended by Smith et al., 2012) without thwarting the meticulously controlled 
cue/response relationships on which weather prediction tasks are based. 
The discrepancy between the rates of responding on the basis of no cue 
information in Whitham and Washburn (2020) and this series of tasks is more curious. 
Because 1,000 trials represented the extent of animals’ experience with each experiment 
in each series of the present tasks, but represented “early learning” in the task of Whitham 
and Washburn, it is possible that this dissertation oversampled animals’ earliest learning 
of a new task. Random or side-biased responses should be evident in these earliest trials, 
in the absence of any learning of cue information that could direct responding otherwise. 
However, those animals in both datasets that demonstrated use of cue based responding 
did so as early as in the first few blocks of a new experiment. A priori, few interindividual 
differences in learning rate within a species are of such magnitude as to require dozens-
fold differences in exposure to cue information for equivalently-complex responses to be 
made. This suggests even more strongly that the disparity in cue-based strategy use is one 
downstream from motivational factors of the monkeys and unquantified factors of their 
testing. Many of the same animals, tested two years later on a mechanically identical set 
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of tasks, demonstrated markedly different appetites for using their cognitive and 
perceptual powers to bolster their reward rate in the task. 
It is difficult, but not impossible, for future work to account better for these 
considerations. Because Experiment 4 demonstrated that (for some monkeys) there is 
some reward rate at which responses that are not based on cue information will give way 
to cue-based responding, it is perhaps reasonable to port these more extreme ITI and 
timeout durations to every experiment, for every monkey. However, just as the same 
parameter values of Whitham and Washburn (2020) were not sufficient to encourage the 
same degree of strategic responding in this dissertation, there is little reason to believe 
that any combination of parameter values will suit different animals (or the same animal 
at two different times) equally well. This challenge is common throughout comparative 
psychological study of animals with as many individual differences (and as rich a 
nontesting life, complete with variable diet, hormonal cycles, social forces, etc.) as 
nonhuman primates. The specific questions of this dissertation, ones of experimental 
manipulations’ effect on individual monkeys’ ability and inclination to deploy strategies 
of heretofore undocumented complexity, make the moving target of subjective motivation 
especially relevant. The design of this dissertation, in which reinforcement factors were 
rigorously controlled for but subjective motivation seemingly varied in uncontrolled and 
unmeasured fashion, leaves open the possibility that monkey would not demonstrate 
multicue strategy use, not necessarily that they could not. Evidence from Experiment 4 
falls short of justifying this last point, as the most extreme adjustments to reward rate 
only attenuated the most motoric, least cognitive of response strategies; they did not elicit 
any unique strategy use. 
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5.4 General Discussion 
This dissertation builds on the work of Whitham and Washburn (2020) to suggest 
much more strongly that monkeys are Single-Cue strategy users to an exceptional degree. 
Primates have proven to be accomplished rule-users in a variety of previous 
categorization tasks, dating to the earliest laboratory-based descriptions of rhesus 
monkey behavior (Hoffman et al., 2009; Kinnaman, 1902). That they were repeatedly 
demonstrated to lean heavily on simple rules when relationships among cues and 
responses were complex, probabilistic, and, perhaps, perceptually difficult to discern, fits 
neatly alongside existing scholarship in comparative and cognitive psychologies. 
The niche modeling used to produce this result is but one of many published 
procedures for analyzing probabilistic categorization data. The models largely produce 
similar results, given the same inputs, and the explanatory virtues that drove selection of 
the strategy analysis perspective employed in the preceding analyses held true. That said, 
every model is imperfect, and other parameters and models might offer additional 
insights into this design and others of its kind. 
In the few cases in which strategic use of multiple cues was identified by the 
strategy analysis above, analyzing blocks of greater than or fewer than 40 trials might 
have been clarifying. Use of 40 trial blocks was informed but arbitrary. An analysis of 
smaller block sizes would be better able to detect strategies that are changing rapidly, 
whereas an analysis of larger block sizes would provide the model with better information 
with which to identify strategy use. An extension of the strategy analysis presented in this 
manuscript might win both of these advantages simultaneously. Many strategy analyses 
could be run with the same data, but variable block sizes. For example, the same data 
could be analyzed three times with blocks made up of 25, 50, and 100 trials. Moreover, 
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the same analysis could use each of 25, 50, and 100 trial blocks in the same analysis (as 
actual strategy use surely changes much more irregularly than once every n trials). The 
analyst could then report the extent to which these analyses agree, and the distribution of 
model fits across the individual strategy analyses. 
Two parameters in particular, learning rate and previous strategy use, would seem 
to be obvious candidates for inclusion in future modeling. A virtue of the analyses 
reported above is that they are memoryless – the strategy identification for a given block 
is not dependent on any previous or future blocks. For questions that are fundamentally 
focused on description, rather than on prediction of future trends in a specific animal’s 
behavior, this feature maintains model sensitivity to what was often a dynamic shift from 
cueless to single-cue responding. The results presented in Chapter 4 make clear, however, 
that strategy identifications for consecutive blocks are very highly autocorrelated (Figure 
4.7). This autocorrelation, known to the experimenter but not to the model, would ideally 
be incorporated into the modeling process as an additional predictor of strategy use in a 
block. Such an incorporation would do much to sharpen strategy identifications above the 
rates of correct identification depicted in Figure 4.1. 
Bayesian model selection, psychologist adoption and interpretation of Bayesian 
techniques, and the tools for Bayesian mixture model specification and fitting have each 
advanced precipitously in the previous decade. Many Bayesian techniques would 
incorporate information from serialized blocks naturally via specification of a prior 
probability that is then updated with observed data (Kruschke & Liddell, 2018b).  As an 
ancillary benefit, estimation of strategy adherence rates would be incorporated into the 
model by default and provide an additional dependent measure on which hypotheses 
about strategy use and individual differences might be tested. Constraints would be 
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required to ensure that the model retains sensitivity to new data, and does not dismiss 
strategic responding because previous blocks were not strategic. Without these 
constraints, the model might get “stuck” with a strategy that was highly evidenced in early 
trials but was an inappropriate depiction of mature responding. With the proper 
constraints in place, an evolved, Bayesian version of the present strategy analysis (akin to 
the Bayesian strategy analysis of Lee, 2016, but on a much larger scale), could do much to 
sharpen detection of strategy use in weather prediction and offer additional description 
of its deployment. 
A principal advantage to the strategy analysis technique used above is that it can 
test an arbitrary number of strategy specifications against each other. Following Meeter 
and colleagues (2006), the strategies specified above ostensibly included all those that 
may reasonably have been employed by human participants. It remains possible, 
however, that another specification might better capture monkeys’ (or humans’) 
behaviors in the task than those represented in Table 4.1. Because of this reality, as well 
as these results’ apparent suitability for future synthesis with allied data on individual 
differences, the rich potential for alternative analysis strategies (Bayesian or otherwise), 
and the more far-reaching virtues of transparent science, all data and code to run analyses 
are publicly available in Open Science Foundation’s repositories. 
The profound, consistent null result of single cue strategy use is not sufficient to 
discriminate between more cognitive sources of the strong predisposition to single cues 
or more perceptual ones. To both the researcher interested in why monkey strategy use is 
not more like that of humans, and the allied researcher interested in what drives the 
complexity of human strategy use, a design that can make this distinction remains a key 
goal of future research. In much of the scholarship of comparative cognition, individual 
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animals, and primates specifically, are exemplary in the most literal of senses. Each 
individual evidences a unique suite of cognitive competencies and motivational 
dispositions that are dictated in part by their species, but often to an equal or greater 
degree by their other traits. In the series of experiments that comprises this dissertation 
this individuality may have been true in the motivational sense, but, uncharacteristically, 
not in the cognitive competencies evidenced by the animals. In the specific set of 
cognitions required to complete weather prediction tasks monkeys have, to this point, 
demonstrated that they are impressively of a kind. This result has held in spite of a 
diversity of task manipulations of theoretical or hypothetical import. Such a monkey 
monolith has few parallels in comparative psychology, and represents a fertile ground for 
continued exploration of what procedural determinants and species differences drive this 
unusual invariance.  
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